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ARTICLES
PATERNALISM AND PSYCHIC TAXES:
THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF
NEGATIVE EMOTIONS TO SAVE US
FROM OURSELVES
GARY M. LUCAS, JR.*

INTRODUCTION
1
Paternalism has become increasingly popular among policymakers.
Governments at all levels are seriously considering or have recently
adopted many paternalistic proposals. For example, the Obama
Administration has increased cigarette taxes and adopted a tax on indoor
tanning.2 Similarly, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg has
I.

proposed a ban on the sale of soda and other sugary drinks in containers
larger than sixteen ounces. 3 All of these policies are motivated to some
degree by a desire to save people from themselves.
This Article analyzes whether the government should use "psychic
taxes" as a tool for achieving paternalistic goals. A psychic tax is a
government policy that imposes a psychic cost by provoking negative

Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. For helpful ideas and
*
suggestions, I thank participants at the 2012 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the 2012
Junior Tax Scholars' Workshop, the 2012 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting,
and workshops hosted by Texas Tech University School of Law and Gonzaga University School of
Law. I also thank Alyssa DiRusso for comments on an earlier draft.
1. For purposes of this Article, I define paternalism broadly as the government's interference
with a person's self-regarding choices with the intent to further that person's welfare. Cf Bill New,
Paternalismand Public Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 65-71 (1999) (using a similar definition).
2.
Anna Tinsley, A Dragfor Tobacco Users: Levy to Fund Children'sHealth Insurance Begins
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-0329,
2009,
Mar.
CHI.
TRIB.,
1,
April
29/news/0903280378_ltobacco-tax-increase-sin-taxes; Michelle Andrews, In All Those Pages, a
Surprise or Two, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/health/30fine.html
(discussing the tax on indoor tanning found in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
3. Michael M. Grynbaum, New York Plans a Ban on Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/3 1/nyregion/bloomberg-plans-a-ban-on-large-sugareddrinks.html.
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emotions such as fear, anxiety, or shame. 4 As with traditional sin taxes, the
government may adopt psychic taxes to modify behavior. This Article
argues that, while psychic taxes hold out the promise of making us

healthier, they are not without potentially serious drawbacks, many of
which have received little or no attention in legal literature. As a result, this
Article expresses skepticism that psychic taxes will serve as a useful form

of paternalistic intervention.
Although many government policies may impose psychic costs

(including policies that simply require disclosure of information), 5 this
Article focuses only on graphic warnings on cigarette and food packages.

Two features of graphic warnings make them particularly interesting. First,
proponents of graphic warnings support them at least in part precisely
because they impose psychic costs. Second, while the empirical evidence is

not conclusive, some research suggests that these warnings may reduce
consumption of unhealthy goods, thereby improving public health and
6
perhaps even saving lives.
In 2011, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") adopted
regulations that would have required graphic warnings on cigarette
packages beginning in September of 2012. 7 Subsequently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that these

regulations violate the First Amendment. 8 The government is reviewing the
4.
See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalismand Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 135 (2006);
George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative
Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 183, 190 (2006) [hereinafter Loewenstein
& O'Donoghue, Easy Way].
5.
For instance, traditional sin taxes have a psychic tax component. They signal that society
disapproves of the taxed good, which could cause consumers to feel guilty about consuming it.
Similarly, textual warnings on cigarettes can impose a psychic cost. By highlighting certain risks,
textual warnings may cause consumers to experience negative emotions that they would not experience
absent the warnings. See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supranote 4, at 190.
6. See infra Part V.C.
7.
21 C.F.R. § 1141.10(a)(1) (2012).
8.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also addressed whether requiring graphic warning labels on
cigarettes violates the First Amendment. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d
509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). Section 201 of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
directs the FDA to adopt regulations requiring graphic warnings on cigarette packages. After adoption
of the Act in 2009, the tobacco companies filed suit and challenged the statute as unconstitutional on its
face. Id. at 552-54. The Sixth Circuit held that the statute did not violate the First Amendment. Id.at
518. Because the tobacco companies filed suit prior to the FDA's adoption of the graphic warning
regulations, the Sixth Circuit did not specifically address whether the nine images chosen by the FDA in
its final regulation are unconstitutional. Id. at 552-54. Rather, the Sixth Circuit simply held that the
statute's requirement of graphic warnings on cigarettes is not itself unconstitutional. Id.
at 568-69.
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appellate court's decision to determine whether to seek review by the
United States Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court finds that the FDA's
regulations are constitutional, the regulations will require that each
cigarette package include one of nine images on a rotating basis. 9 The
images must cover half of the package, and they are quite explicit.' ° They
include a corpse with staples in its chest, a man expelling smoke out of a
tracheotomy hole in his throat, and a pair of diseased lungs juxtaposed with
a pair of healthy lungs. 1'1 The regulations would also require that the new
labels contain a textual component, which would include statements such
as "Smoking can kill you" and "Cigarettes cause cancer."' 12 Finally, the
warnings would include a telephone number that smokers can call if they
want help with quitting: "1-800-QUIT-NOW."13
Policymakers are also considering graphic warnings on food packages.
One possibility is a system that uses traffic-light color-coding.14 The front
of each food package would contain a green, yellow, or red label. Green
would signify the healthiest foods, yellow would signify less healthy foods,
and red would signify the least healthy foods.15 A second possibility is
graphic warnings indicating the expected body type of a person who
consumes a particular food on a regular basis.' 6 Healthy foods would

9.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,648-57
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
10.
21 C.F.R. § 1141.10(a)(l) (2012).
11.
You can download the images from the FDA's website. Tobacco Products: Product
Requirements,
Marketing
&
Labeling,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2012).
12.
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-3 1, § 201(a), 123
Stat 1776 (2009).
13.
21 C.F.R. § 1141.
13.
Id. § 1141.10(a)(1).
14.
Traffic-light color-coding is used in the United Kingdom. Food Labels, NAT'L HEALTH
SERV., http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/Goodfood/Pages/food-labelling.aspx (last updated Mar. 21, 2011).
Researchers in the United States have studied its potential effectiveness. See, e.g., Anne N. Thorndike et
al., A 2-Phase Labeling and Choice Architecture Intervention to Improve Healthy Food and Beverage
Choices, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 527, 527 (2012).
15.
Thomdike, supranote 14, at 527-28. In the United Kingdom, rather than indicate the overall
healthfulness of the food, the color-coding scheme applies to each of the various food components,
specifically fat, saturated fat, salt, and sugar. Green indicates that the food is low in these items, amber
indicates a medium amount of these items, and red indicates a high amount. According to the National
Health Service, "[i]f you buy a food that has all or mostly green lights, you know straight away that it's
a healthier choice." On the other hand, "a red light means the food is high in fat, saturated fat, salt or
sugars and these are the foods we should cut down on." FoodLabels, supra note 14.
16.
At a conference hosted by the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research
Service, George Loewenstein presented the preliminary results of a study that examines the
effectiveness of graphic food warnings that indicate expected body type. The discussion in this Article
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contain an image (for example, a drawing) of a thin person, and unhealthy
foods would contain an image of an obese person. Foods that fall in the
middle of the health spectrum would contain an image of a person who is
somewhere between thin and obese.
Graphic warnings and other psychic taxes are a form of paternalism.
Despite its increasing popularity, paternalism remains highly controversial.
Parts II through IV of this Article discuss the debate over whether
paternalism is ever justifiable. An understanding of this debate will assist in
following the arguments made in Parts V and VI, which address
specifically whether psychic taxes are a useful policy instrument. Parts V
and VI constitute the core of the Article and contain its main contribution.
Parts II through IV provide background information that should be useful
for those readers not versed in the literature on paternalism.
Part II explains the objections to paternalism offered by traditional
economists and economically oriented legal scholars. These scholars view
people as rational actors who carefully weigh costs and benefits and make
choices that maximize their own utility (or well-being).17 If this view is
correct, paternalism in general, and psychic taxes in particular, should play
no role in government policy. If we make the best possible choices for
ourselves, then the government harms us when it interferes with those
choices.
Nonetheless, the rational actor model has its detractors.' 8 Part III
discusses several empirical observations that raise questions about the
model's application to smoking and eating. These observations provide
evidence that people are not perfectly rational. Instead, they suffer from
self-control problems and engage in behavior that seems inconsistent with
rational utility maximization. Paternalists use the evidence presented in
Part III to argue that the rational actor model does not accurately explain
is based on Loewenstein's presentation. George Loewenstein, The Price Is Wrong, Economics,
Behavioral
Economics,
and
Obesity
(Apr.
15,
2010),
https:/Hadmin.acrobat.com/_a934360949/p22312150.
17.
E.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 496 (2007); Colin Camerer
et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric
Paternalism", 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1214-18 (2003) (discussing and rejecting the traditional

rational actor model).
18.
See generally Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON.
1825 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70

U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); Camerer et al., supra note 17; Jonathan Gruber & Botond K6szegi, Is
Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1261 (2001) [hereinafter Gruber &
K6szegi, Is Addiction "Rational"?];Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The
Economic Casefor Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1180-86 (1998).
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how people decide whether to smoke and how much to eat. 19 Paternalists
invoke a number of alternative theories in support of psychic taxes and
other types of government intervention. Part IV describes these theories.
Parts V and VI focus specifically on psychic taxes. Part V discusses
the potential benefits of psychic taxes. It explains that if people are not
perfectly rational, then the government could use psychic taxes to correct
welfare-reducing mistakes. Part V also reviews the empirical evidence
regarding whether graphic warnings actually reduce unhealthy
consumption.
Despite the potential benefits of psychic taxes, Part VI argues that in
practice, they may do more harm than good and that they will often be
unnecessary. People who are not perfectly rational may be able to cope
with self-control problems and other failures of rationality without
government intervention. For example, many people have developed
strategies for overcoming their self-control problems and other limitations.
Also, market-based solutions to the problems posed by irrationality often
reduce the need for government involvement. In addition, psychic taxes
carry with them potential costs, and these costs, which are often hidden,
may outweigh any benefits. Heterogeneity is a major obstacle. For
example, some people may eat to excess, while others do not. But psychic
taxes on food are a one-size-fits-all solution, and they impose a psychic
cost on everyone, even those who are not at risk of becoming obese.
Psychic taxes on food may also further stigmatize obesity, which could
have regrettable consequences. And special interest groups, such as the
food industry, may exert excessive influence over any governmentmandated labeling scheme so that the resulting labels deceive consumers
rather than informing them. Moreover, widespread acceptance of psychic
taxes as a legitimate policy tool may create a slippery slope, leading to the
adoption of laws that many people will find objectionable or even abusive.
For instance, some state governments currently use psychic taxes to
dissuade women from having abortions.2" Abortion-rights advocates will
likely find it easier to oppose this practice if the public generally views

See, e.g., Gruber & Kdszegi, Is Addiction "Rational"?, supra note 18, at 1277-79;
19.
O'Donoghue & Rabin, supranote 18, at 1825-26.
See infra Part VI.F.3. Cf Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion:
20.
Implications of Social Science Research on Emotionfor Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008)
(discussing the possibility that the information presented to women to satisfy informed-consent abortion
laws might cause women "to be inappropriately persuaded by emotional biases") [hereinafter
Blumenthal, Abortion].
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psychic taxes with suspicion than if psychic taxes are an established
instrument for manipulating behavior.
II. THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL

Smoking and obesity are major public health concerns. In 2010, 19
percent of American adults smoked.2 1 Smoking can reduce life expectancy
by an estimated range of 3.6 to 8 years. 22 Moreover, over 60 percent of
Americans are either overweight or obese. 23 Obesity may contribute to
hypertension, type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, and numerous
other diseases. 24 Given these statistics, psychic taxes and other paternalistic

policies have obvious appeal. These policies promise to reduce smoking
and overeating, which should lead to longer, healthier lives.
Nonetheless, some economists and economically oriented legal
scholars argue that the fact that a policy might improve public health does
not necessarily mean the government should adopt it. These scholars claim
that the government should avoid policies that distort consumption
25
decisions, even if those policies reduce consumption of unhealthy goods.
The reason is that people might be willing to trade off health to achieve
other goals.
Traditionally, economists have based their policy recommendations on
the doctrines of consumer sovereignty and revealed preference. 26 Consumer
21.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S.

ADULTS: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2010, at 10 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr 0_252.pdf.
22.
W. Kip Viscusi & Jahn K. Hakes, Risk Beliefs and Smoking Behavior, 46 ECON. INQUIRY
45, 48-49 (2008).
23.
Adam Drewnowski & SE Specter, Poverty and Obesity: The Role of Energy Density and
Energy Costs, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 6, 6 (2004).
24.
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, CLINICAL GUIDELINES ON THE IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION,
AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS, NAT'L INST. HEALTH PUBL'N No. 98-

4083 12 (1998). The extent to which overweight and obesity adversely affect health is a controversial
question. See infra Part VI.F.
25.
E.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 144-46 (1992) [hereinafter
VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION]; ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
SMOKING ix-xi, 162-64 (1992). See also Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 94, 103 (2005) (arguing that since smokers "appear to believe that the benefits
that they experience from the activity outweigh the costs [it is] not at all clear that eliminating smoking
will enhance social welfare").
26.
E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 59, 86-88 (1999); B. Douglas
Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, From Neuroscience to Public Policy: A New Economic View of
Addiction, 12 SWED. ECON. POL'Y REV. 99, 126-28 (2005) [hereinafter Bernheim & Rangel, New
Economic View]; Paul Calcott, Paternalismand Public Choice, 17 VICTORIA ECON. COMMENT. 39, 39
(2000).
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sovereignty is the principle that-except to the extent necessary to prevent
harm to others-the government should respect people's preferences
regarding what products to consume. 27 The government does not know
better than the individual what consumption pattern will maximize the
individual's utility. Moreover, policymakers should not force their
preferences onto others. 28 The doctrine of revealed preference is the notion
that people's choices reveal their preferences. 29 So if you drink Dr. Pepper
rather than Coke, we can infer that you like Dr. Pepper more than you like
Coke.
Both consumer sovereignty and revealed preference are consistent
with the rational actor model. Economists generally assume that people are
rational. This means that we are informed and forward looking, and we
accurately weigh the costs and benefits of our decisions to maximize our
utility in light of our preferences. 30 Consumer sovereignty, revealed
31
preference, and the rational actor model leave no room for paternalism.
The government should respect what we (as individuals) want for
ourselves. And since we rationally maximize our own utility, the
government can infer our preferences from the choices we make. So
government interference with our self-regarding decisions, for example,
decisions about whether to smoke or what to eat, makes us worse off.
At this point, a non-economist might ask the following question: can
the rational actor model really explain phenomena as seemingly irrational
as obesity and smoking? Perhaps the answer is yes. For example, empirical
evidence confirms that people eat more when they like a particular food
than when they do not.32 Moreover, foods that contain sugar and fat
generally "provide more sensory enjoyment and more pleasure than do

27.
28.

E.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 86-88; Calcott, supranote 26, at 39-41.
Bernheim & Rangel, New Economic View, supra note 26, at 126.

29.

Id.

30.
E.g., MANKIW, supra note 17, at 496; Jonathan Gruber, Government Policy Toward
Smoking: A View from Economics, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POLY, L. & ETHICS 119, 120 (2002); Carnerer et
al.,
supra note 17, at 1214-15; Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96
J. POL. ECON. 675, 675 (1988).
31.
E.g., Bernheim & Rangel, New Economic View, supra note 26, at 127-28; Gruber, supra

note 30, at 120.
32.
Brian Wansink, Environmental Factors that Increase the Food Intake and Consumption
Volume of Unknowing Consumers, 24 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 455, 464-65 (2004) [hereinafter Wansink,
Environmental Factors].
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foods that [do] not.",33 So it is possible that at least some people rationally
accept weight gain in exchange for eating foods that they enjoy.
In addition, the rational actor model might also apply to addictive
goods like cigarettes. Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy have shown that

addiction is not necessarily inconsistent with rational utility
maximization. 34 Addiction simply complicates the cost-benefit calculation.
Instead of weighing the costs and benefits of smoking a single cigarette, the
smoker must account for the possibility of addiction. 35 Addiction means
that smoking today increases the desire to smoke in the future. Because
future smoking increases both monetary costs and health damage, rational
smokers consider the current and future costs of smoking, taking addiction
and health damage into account. In other words, according to rational
addiction theory, smokers might know they could become addicted and
harm their health, but still choose to smoke anyway because they have
rationally determined that smoking is worth the risk.
The idea that smoking may be rational is not as far-fetched as it might
seem. Some evidence is broadly consistent with the theory.36 For example,
smoking appears to produce benefits that make it attractive to certain
people, including reducing stress, depression, and anxiety; aiding in
concentration and memory; preventing weight gain; 37 and facilitating social

interaction. 38 So at least some people might rationally decide that the risks

33.
Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 23, at 8. This could be because in times of scarcity, these
foods conferred a survival advantage. Id.
34.
Becker & Murphy, supranote 30, at 675.
35.
Id. at 675-82; JONATHAN GRUBER & BOTOND KOSZEGI, A MODERN ECONOMIC VIEW OF
TOBACCO TAXATION 4 (2008) [hereinafter GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW]; Gruber, supra note
30, at 120.
36.
For an in-depth review of this evidence, see Gary Lucas, Jr., Saving Smokers from
Themselves: The PaternalisticUse of Cigarette Taxes, 80 CIN. L. REV. 693, 698-706 (2012).
37.
For a discussion of whether quitting smoking leads to weight gain, see infra Part VIF.
38.
Stephen Heishman, a scientist at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and his colleagues
recently published a meta-analysis of 41 studies of the effects of nicotine on both smokers and
nonsmokers. Stephen J. Heishman, Bethea A. Kleykamp & Edward G. Singleton, Meta-Analysis of the
Acute Effects of Nicotine and Smoking on Human Performance, 210 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 453,
453-64 (2010). The study finds "significant positive effect sizes of nicotine on motor abilities,
attention, and memory, which likely represent true performance facilitation." Id. at 464. Because the
study finds significant positive effects for nonsmokers as well as smokers, Heishman concludes that
"nicotine's performance enhancing effects might be one reason people decide to start smoking." Id. See
also Cynthia S. Pomerleau, Co-Factorsfor Smoking and Evolutionary Psychobiology, 92 ADDICTION
397, 400-01 (1997); Naomi Breslau, M. Marlyne Kilbey & Patricia Andreski, Nicotine Dependence,
Major Depression, and Anxiety in Young Adults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1069, 1071-73
(1991). In a survey of smokers aged 50-70, 41 percent reported that they had relapsed after quitting due
to stress. Only 14 percent reported relapse due to habit or physical addiction. Ahmed Khwaja, Dan
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associated with smoking are worth it in the same way that people rationally
decide to engage in other risky activities, such as driving on busy highways
39
and skiing.
Moreover, people are not blind to the costs of smoking, both monetary
and nonmonetary. Smokers cut back or quit in response to cigarette price
increases, including price increases that they anticipate will occur in the
future. 40 And increased public awareness of the risks associated with
smoking has contributed to cutting the smoking rate in half over the past
fifty years.41 Similarly, smokers have reduced smoking duration (the period
of time a smoker smokes before quitting) in response to evidence that
quitting smoking prolongs life.42 In fact, many smokers now quit smoking
by their mid-thirties, which means that they avoid most of the excess
43
mortality caused by smoking.
In sum, if the standard economic view of eating and smoking is
correct, then paternalistic policies-including psychic taxes designed to
curb overeating and smoking-are harmful. The government cannot help
rational actors by interfering with their self-regarding decisions.
This conclusion comes with two important caveats. The first caveat
relates to imperfect information. If people underestimate the addictive
nature of smoking or the health risks of smoking and obesity, then, even if
they are otherwise rational, people may smoke and eat suboptimally. 44 In
that case, the government could potentially make people better off by
supplying pertinent information. However, the government could
accomplish this goal simply by providing the information in a textual
format that is not specifically designed to elicit an emotional response. In
other words, the rational actor model does not provide a theoretical basis
for packaging information so as to maximize psychic costs. For instance,
according to the rational actor model, imperfect information might justify a
Silverman & Frank Sloan, Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions, 26 J. HEALTH
ECON. 927, 929-30 (2007).
39.
Cf Khwaja, Silverman & Sloan, supra note 38, at 930 ("Judging from the reasons that
people give for quitting and relapsing, more is at work than simple physical addiction.").
40.
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., THE PRICE OF SMOKING 9 (2004).
41.
See Lucas, supra note 36, at 700-01.
42.
John P. Pierce & Elizabeth Gilpin, How Long Will Today's New Adolescent Smoker Be
Addicted to Cigarettes?,86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253, 253-54 (1996).
43.
Donald Taylor et al., Benefits of Smoking Cessationfor Longevity, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
990, 994 (2002). See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF
SMOKING CESSATION vi (1990).
44.
A number of studies suggest that in general, smokers and nonsmokers overestimate the risks
associated with smoking. For a review of the literature, see Lucas, supranote 36, at 712-13.
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requirement that tobacco manufacturers warn consumers that smoking
increases their risk of lung cancer. But the model does not supply a
rationale for requiring provocative images, such as diseased lungs, in an
effort to trigger an aversive emotional response.
The second caveat relates to negative externalities. Even if people are
rational, government intervention might be justified to protect third parties.
For example, smoking and obesity might produce external costs such as
additional medical expenses paid for by Medicaid, Medicare, and other
taxpayer-funded programs.4 5 Because these costs fall on third parties,

rational consumers will ignore them. This means that people may smoke
and eat more than the socially optimal amount. In theory, government
intervention could avoid this problem by forcing people to internalize any
external costs.

Nonetheless, if external costs provide the rationale for intervention,
then a traditional sin tax is arguably superior to a psychic tax. After all, a
psychic tax does not raise revenue that the government can use to defray
the additional costs it incurs as a result of smoking and obesity. Moreover,
the extent of the external costs associated with both smoking and obesity is
extremely controversial, which makes it difficult to determine the degree to
which the government should intervene. 46 Some economists have

concluded that existing cigarette taxes already exceed the external costs of
smoking so that additional regulation is unnecessary. 47 Similarly, recent

research challenges the argument that government intervention to reduce
obesity is justifiable on externality grounds. 48 In any event, if the

government adopts a sin tax reflecting the external costs of smoking and

45.
For a review of the literature on smoking externalities, see Lucas, supra note 36, at 708-11.
For a review of the literature on obesity externalities, see Colin Hector, Nudging Towards Nutrition?
Soft Paternalism and Obesity-Related Reform, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 105-08 (2012); Katherine
Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Argumentsfor Anti-obesity Soda Taxes andFood Taxes,
87 TUL. L. REV. 73, 79-87 (2012); Jay Bhattacharya and Neeraj Sood, Who Pays for Obesity?, 25 J.
ECON. PERSP. 139, 147-55 (2011); and Armineh Zohrabian & Tomas J. Philipson, External Costs of
Risky Health Behaviors Associated with Leading Actual Causes of Death in the U.S.: A Review of the
Evidence and Implications for Future Research, 7 INT'L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 2460, 2464-65
(2010).
46.
For a discussion of the controversy surrounding smoking externalities, see Lucas, supranote
36, at 708-11. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding obesity externalities, see Hector, supra
note 45, at 105-08 and Pratt, supra note 45, at 79-87.
47.
For a review of the literature, see Lucas, supra note 36, at 708-11.
48.
See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Sood, supra note 45, at 153 (concluding "that the classic
Pigovian case for intervention-that social welfare can be improved if those who impose externalities
on others are required to internalize the social costs-does not apply especially well to obesity").
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obesity then, according to the rational actor model, it should not also adopt
a paternalistic psychic tax.
III. PROBLEMATIC EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS
Paternalists reject the consumer sovereignty doctrine, the revealed
preference doctrine, and the rational actor model. 49 They cite a number of
empirical observations that suggest that people do not make rational
decisions about smoking and eating. This Part discusses those problematic
50

observations.

A. SELF-CONTROL PROBLEMS

A self-control problem exists when a person cannot carry out the
consumption plan that he or she deems best.5

Rational actors exercise

complete self-control. For example, once they decide that the costs of
continuing to smoke outweigh the benefits, rational smokers have no
problem quitting cigarettes, even if they are addicted. Quitting might be
unpleasant, but the rational smoker will do it anyway so long as the costs of
smoking exceed the benefits. Similarly, rational dieters stick to a chosen
diet because, according to their own calculations, the benefits of dieting
outweigh the costs.
But real people differ from the rational actors of economic theory.
Although some smokers quit and some dieters lose weight, many people
have trouble following through on their long-term plans. 52 The notion of
rational utility maximization is hard to reconcile with smokers who
repeatedly attempt, but fail to quit, and dieters who try one diet after
another without success.

49.

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.

50.
For additional discussion of some of these empirical observations, see B. Douglas Bemheim
& Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Nonstandard
Decision-Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 7, 43-45 (Peter Diamond &
Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) [hereinafter Bernheim & Rangel, NonstandardDecision-Makers).
51.
See Gruber & Kdszegi, Is Addiction "Rational"?,supra note 18, at 1277-79.
52.
About half of all Americans who have ever smoked have successfully quit. CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: 2009 NATIONAL
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 10, 85 (2010). But over 40 percent of smokers report attempting to quit
each year, and only 4-7 percent of those attempts are successful. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., TREATING TOBACCO USE DEPENDENCE: 2008 UPDATE 15 (2008). Similarly, a review of studies
on the effects of dieting concludes that, in general, diets do not lead to long-term weight loss, and many
people actually regain more weight than they lost while on the diet. See generally Traci Mann et al.,
Medicare's Searchfor Effective Obesity Treatments: Diets Are Not the Answer, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
220 (2007).
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COMMITMENT DEVICES

People often control their behavior by intentionally limiting their
available options.5 3 A smoker may throw cigarettes away, and a dieter may
avoid keeping snacks at home. The apparent purpose is to commit to
quitting smoking or to losing weight by taking steps either to avoid
anticipated cravings or to avoid giving in to those cravings when they
occur. Commitment devices are common but are inconsistent with the
standard rational actor model. In the rational actor model, a person is better
54
off (or at least no worse off) when the set of possible choices increases.
Put differently, because rational actors have complete self-control, they
have no need to commit to their long-term plans by placing certain options
off limits. 55 Yet people frequently do just that.
C. REGRET

Because they are well informed and forward looking, rational actors
carefully plan and carry out the lifetime consumption path that maximizes
their utility. Rational actors would not conclude that they made a mistake
by smoking at some point in the past. Yet people often express regret about
smoking and claim that they would be better off if they did not smoke. 56 In
other words, the stated preferences of smokers sometimes conflict with
their actual behavior. Paternalists interpret this as evidence that the
revealed preference doctrine is wrong and that smokers recognize that
57
smoking reduces their utility.
Nonetheless, defenders of the revealed preference doctrine point out
that stated preferences are often unreliable. One reason is that our incentive
to say that we prefer a course of action may differ from our incentive to
actually choose that course of action. 58 For example, smokers may claim
that they regret smoking and would like to quit, not because they truly do,

53.
For a discussion of the use of commitment devices by smokers, see Gruber & K6szegi, Is
Addiction "Rational"?,supra note 18, at 1278. For a discussion of commitment devices used for other
purposes, including weight loss, see generally Gharad Bryan, Dean Karlan & Scott Nelson,
Commitment Devices, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 671 (2010).
54.
Simona Botti & Sheen S. lyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social
Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETiNG. 14,25-26 (2006).
55.
See Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction "Rational"?,supra note 18, at 1278.
56.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 52, at 15 ("Epidemiologic
data suggest that more than 70 percent of the 45 million smokers in the United States today report that
they want to quit, and approximately 44 percent report that they try to quit each year.").
57.
See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 18, at 1193-1209.
58.
Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism,
B.Y.U. L. REv. 905, 919-21 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem].
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but because in a society that frowns upon smoking, this is what they are
expected to say.59 They may also simply mean that they would prefer it if
they could smoke without risk.6 ° Or perhaps those who have smoked over a
long period recognize that the pleasure of smoking is in the past. 6 1 They are
simply unhappy with their current options and regret that the bill has come
due. But if they could go back in time, they would still make the choice to
smoke.
In fact, some evidence suggests that, although many smokers want to
quit eventually, they are not serious about quitting in the near future. For
example, a national survey of daily smokers finds that approximately
62
60 percent report that they do not intend to quit in the next six months.
Smokers also frequently fail to take advantage of proven cessation
treatments, such as nicotine replacement therapy.63 And smokers generally
oppose government regulation that might
facilitate quitting, such as high
64
cigarette taxes and public smoking bans.

59.
W. Kip Viscusi, The New CigarettePaternalism,25 REG. 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Viscusi,
Paternalism].
60.
VISCuSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 25, at 120. Viscusi points out that people often
express dissatisfaction with some attribute of a particular product or activity. Id. For example, nearly
one-third of blue-collar workers claim that they would like to leave their jobs. Id. Their failure to quit
does not prove irrationality. Cf Becker & Murphy, supra note 30, at 693 (stating that the claims of
smokers that they want to quit are "no different from the claims of single persons that they want to but
are unable to marry or from the claims of disorganized persons that they want to become better
organized").
61.
Robert S. Goldfarb, Thomas C. Leonard & Steven M. Suranovic, Are Rival Theories of
Smoking Underdetermined?,8 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 229, 235 (2001).
62.
Mary Ellen Wewers et al., Distribution of Daily Smokers by Stage of Change: Current
PopulationSurvey Results, 36 PREVENTATIVE MED. 710, 714 (2003). Only 15 percent of smokers plan
to quit in the next 30 days. Gregory Colman & Dahlia Remler, Vertical Equity Consequences of Very
High Cigarette Tax Increases: If the PoorAre the Ones Smoking, How Could Cigarette Tax Increases
Be Progressive?, 27 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 376, 396 (2008).
63.
Cessation aids such as varenicline and nicotine gum substantially increase the likelihood of
successful abstinence. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 52, at 109. As a result, the
medical community strongly supports cessation aids and generally recommends their use in connection
with all quit attempts. Id. at 106. But one study finds that fewer than 22 percent of current smokers who
attempted to quit for at least one day in the preceding year used medication. Id. at 12.
64.
For example, in one survey, nearly 70 percent of people who had never smoked supported a
ban on smoking in restaurants, while that figure was only 26 percent among smokers. Joni Hersch,
Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 14 (2005). Among
Connecticut voters surveyed in 2002, 66 percent of smokers opposed a proposed cigarette tax increase,
while 78 percent of nonsmokers supported it. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Harmful Addiction,
74 REV. ECON. STUD. 147, 151 (2007).
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Nonetheless, while people's statements about their preferences might
be suspect, those statements may also reveal valuable information." After
all, if the goal is to determine what people want, it probably makes sense to
consider their stated views on the subject. So policymakers should arguably
take seriously the fact that many smokers say that they regret smoking.
D. CUE-TRIGGERED CONSUMPTION

The rational actor model assumes that people make decisions based on
their underlying preferences. But behavior is sometimes affected by
environmental cues, many of which seem irrelevant to rational decision
making.
Cues play a role in addiction. 66 For example, a smoker who has
successfully abstained from smoking for several weeks may find a
forgotten pack of cigarettes (the cue) in a drawer and then experience a
sudden, unexpected craving. Because of the power of cues, successful
67
quitting may require significant changes in lifestyle and environment.
Successful addiction therapies often teach cue-management and cue68
avoidance.
Cues also play a role in eating. 69 For example, people tend to eat
substantially more when food is served on large plates rather than small
ones. v° If random cues like plate size influence consumption decisions, then
the theory that people make eating decisions according to their true
preferences becomes questionable.
E. UNDERESTIMATING ADDICTION
Most of the health damage due to smoking results from smoking over
a long period of time, so a person might rationally choose to smoke for a
short period and then quit before the damage becomes serious and
irreversible. In fact, many smokers appear to fit this pattern. Roughly half
of modem-day smokers will quit by their mid-thirties, which means that

65.

See John Beshears et al., How Are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1787, 1792

(2008).
66.
George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in GETTING HOOKED: RATIONALITY
AND ADDICTION 235, 243-45 (Jon Elster & Ole-Jorgen Skog eds., 1999) [hereinafter Loewenstein,
Addiction].
67.
Id. at 245.
68.
Bernheim & Rangel, NonstandardDecision-Makers,supra note 50, at 44-45.
69.
Wansink, Environmental Factors,supra note 32, at 458-68.
70. Id. at 468-69.
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they have virtually the same life expectancy as someone who has never
smoked.71
Nonetheless, some smokers may underestimate their susceptibility to
addiction. For example, one study asked high school seniors who smoked
whether they would quit within five years.7" Many of those who stated that
they would quit did not in fact do so. 73 This finding is potentially
important, because people who underestimate addiction may start smoking
when they otherwise would not.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL
This Part describes several theories that attempt to account for some or
all of the problematic empirical observations discussed in Part III. The
theme underlying these theories is that people are not perfectly rational,
and the choices they make with respect to smoking and eating do not
always maximize their utility.
In analyzing psychic taxes on cigarettes and food, it is important to
understand the theories discussed in this Part. These theories form the
foundation for modern health paternalism. Paternalists use these theories to
argue that, contrary to the standard economic view, paternalism is
sometimes justifiable.7 4 In other words, if at least one of the theories
explained in this Part is correct, then government intervention, including
psychic taxes, could yield substantial benefits by avoiding people's
75
welfare-reducing mistakes.
Moreover, paternalists argue that intervention based on the theories
discussed in this Part would make people better off as judged by those
people's own internal standards, not the standards of the paternalists who
advocate regulation. Put differently, instead of forcing the values of
paternalists upon us, the government could help us make the choices that
we would make ourselves if we were perfectly rational.76

71.
Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 42, at 253-54; Taylor et al., supranote 43, at 994.
72.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG
PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 68-71 (1994).

73.
74.
75.

Id.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18.
E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1162; Camerer et al., supranote 17, at 1218.

76.

E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1162 (stating that "it is legitimate for private and

public institutions to attempt to influence people's behavior even when third-party effects are absent"
because "in some cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare-decisions
that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of

self-control").
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The theories described in this Part are also important because
determining whether psychic taxes are a suitable response to irrationality
requires a theory as to the exact nature of the problem and its specific
source. Psychic taxes may not be an appropriate means of addressing all
types of irrationality. So it is necessary to identify precisely why we believe
that people smoke and eat suboptimally.
A. MINDLESS EATING

Food researcher Brian Wansink argues that people often unknowingly
eat more than they intend. Wansink refers to this phenomenon as mindless
eating.77 One reason for mindless eating is that environmental cues and
other factors may affect the accuracy with which we monitor the amount of
food we eat.7 s Our bodies are not good at signaling when we have
consumed just enough calories to maintain our current weight,7 9 so we
often rely on external cues to monitor our consumption.80 For example,
many people follow a rule whereby they routinely eat or drink everything
on their plate or in their glass. 8 The problem is that we tend to put more

food onto larger plates than smaller plates, and we pour more into short,
wide glasses than into tall, slender glasses. 82 When combined with the habit

of cleaning the plate or drinking the entire glass, this tendency can lead us
to consume more calories than we intend. 83 In fact, a number of studies
show that people eat more when eating out of a large container or package

77.
BRIAN WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING 15 (2010) [hereinafter WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING].
78.
Wansink, EnvironmentalFactors,supra note 32, at 458-59.
79.
See Brian Wansink, David R. Just & Collin R. Payne, Mindless Eating and Healthy
Heuristicsfor the Irrational,99 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 165, 166-67 (2009) [hereinafter
Wansink, Just & Payne, Healthy Heuristics].
80.
Wansink, EnvironmentalFactors,supra note 32, at 458-59.
81.
Brian Wansink, James E. Painter & Jill North, Bottomless Bowls: Why Visual Cues of
Portion Size May Influence Intake, 13 OBESITY RES. 93, 93-94 (2005) [hereinafter Wansink, Painter &
North, Bottomless Bowls].
82.
The effects of plate size and glass shape may be explained in part by optical illusions. For
example, a given amount of food appears smaller on a large plate than a small one. For a review of the
literature on the effects of plate size and glass shape, see Wansink, Environmental Factors,supra note
32, at 468-69.
83.
In one study, participants ate soup. Some participants received regular bowls. Others
received bowls that, unbeknownst to the participants, were hooked to an apparatus that caused the
bowls to slowly and imperceptibly refill as they ate. Those eating out of the self-refilling bowls ate 73
percent more soup, yet they did not perceive that they ate more or felt fuller. Wansink, Painter & North,
Bottomless Bowls, supra note 81, at 96-98.
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or off of a large 84plate rather than out of a small container or package or off
of a small plate.
Mindless eating may also result from the tendency to eat food simply
because it is visible or otherwise salient. s5 One study finds that secretaries
eat substantially more chocolates out of a container sitting on their desk if
the container is clear rather than opaque. 86 When food is salient, not eating
it requires willpower. 87 Eventually, we wear down and give in to
temptation. Additionally, salient food may trigger physiological processes
that cause us to feel hungry even though we otherwise would not.8 8
Is mindless eating consistent with the rational actor model? That
model assumes that people decide how much to eat based on underlying
preferences, such as enjoyment of food and desired body type. It might be
possible to reconcile certain mindless eating research with rationality but,
in most cases, doing so is difficult. 89 For example, it seems unlikely that
people eat more off of large plates because large plates make food taste
better. Moreover, in many of Wansink's studies, participants who eat more
as a result of environmental cues also underestimate the calories that they

84.
Wansink, Environmental Factors, supra note 32, at 467-69; Brian Wansink & Junyong
Kim, Bad Popcorn in Big Buckets: Portion Size Can Influence Intake as Much as Taste, 37 J.
NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 242, 242-45 (2005). In one study, researchers randomly gave moviegoers
either a medium or large container of popcorn. The moviegoers who received the large container ate an
average of 53 percent more popcorn. One possible explanation is that large containers make it difficult
to keep track of how much you have eaten, which makes it easier to eat mindlessly. Brian Wansink &
SeaBum Park, At the Movies: How External Cues and PerceivedTaste Impact Consumption Volume, 12
FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 69, 69-74 (2001). Interestingly, a follow-up study finds that the
tendency to eat more out of larger containers applies (though to a somewhat lesser extent) even when
the popcorn tastes bad because it is stale. Wansink & Kim, supra, at 242-45. Another determinant of
how accurately people monitor consumption is how distracted they are while they eat. People tend to
eat more if they eat while distracted, for example, while watching television or dining with others.
When distracted, they may rely heavily on easy-to-monitor visual cues to determine when to stop (for
example, whether the plate is clean or their dinner companion has stopped eating). So distractions may
lead people to eat or drink whatever is in front of them. Brian Wansink & Collin R. Payne, Counting
Bones: Environmental Cues that DecreaseFood Intake, 104 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 273, 27374 (2007); Wansink et al., Bottomless Bowls, supra note 81, at 94; Wansink, Environmental Factors,
supranote 32, at 462-64.
85.
Wansink, EnvironmentalFactors,supra note 32, at 465.
86.
Brian Wansink, James E. Painter & Yeon-Kyung Lee, The Office Candy Dish: Proximity's
Influence on Estimated and Actual Consumption, 30 INT'L J. OBESITY 871, 872-73 (2006).
87.
Wansink, EnvironmentalFactors,supra note 32, at 465.
88.
Id.
89.
For Wansink's views on eating and rationality, see Wansink, Just & Payne, Healthy
Heuristics,supra note 79, at 166-67.
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consume, often by a substantial amount. 90 This finding suggests a failure to
rationally maximize utility.
B.

THE VISCERAL FACTORS PERSPECTIVE

Visceral factors exert substantial influence over our behavior. 9'
Visceral factors include moods, emotions, pain, drug craving, and drive
states, such as thirst, hunger, and sexual desire.9 2 Visceral factors like
hunger focus our attention on achieving certain goals. 93 Although visceral
factors are generally adaptive, George Loewenstein argues that they
sometimes drive people to act against their self-interest. 94 People cope with
visceral factors in an optimal way when experienced at low levels of
intensity, such as mild hunger.95 But as visceral factors become more
intense, Loewenstein argues that behavior becomes less volitional. 96 People
begin to experience internal conflict between their behavior and the
behavior they perceive to be in their self-interest. At very high levels of
intensity, visceral factors may overwhelm volitional choice altogether. 97 In
other words, as visceral factors become more intense, behavior becomes
non-normative. For example, a person who is extremely tired may fall
asleep while driving.

90.
For example, in the bottomless bowl study discussed supra note 81, participants given the
self-refilling soup bowls ate 140 more calories than they estimated. By comparison, participants given
regular bowls ate only 32 more calories than they estimated. Wansink, Painter & North, Bottomless
Bowls, supra note 83, at 96. In general, people seem unaware that environmental cues influence how
much they eat. In fact, when Wansink asks the participants in his studies whether a particular cue might
affect their consumption, the participants generally acknowledge that the cues might influence others
but claim that they themselves are immune to these effects. WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING, supra note
77, at 23-24.
91.
See generally Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66; George Loewenstein, Out of Control:
Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996)
[hereinafter Loewenstein, Out of Control].
92.
Loewenstein, Addiction, supranote 66, at 237.
93.
Visceral factors focus our attention in several ways. First, they increase the relative value of
the activities and the forms of consumption associated with the visceral factor. For example, hunger
increases the value of food relative to sex. Second, visceral factors cause people to become presentoriented with respect to the associated good. For example, hunger might cause people to make
shortsighted trade-offs between food today and food tomorrow, even if they will likely be hungrier
tomorrow than today. Third, visceral factors focus attention inwardly and away from others. People
who are extremely hungry or craving drugs become selfish. Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note
91, at 274-75.
94.
Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 238-40.
95.
Id. at 238.
96.
Id. at 239.
97.
Id. at 239-40.
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For purposes of this Article, a visceral factor that is of particular
interest is cue-triggered craving, which may result from classical
conditioning. To illustrate classical conditioning, consider an example
based on Ivan Pavlov's well-known dog experiments. 98 The researcher
presents the dog with a bell (the conditioned stimulus) in conjunction with
food (the unconditioned stimulus). Initially, the food causes the dog to
salivate (the unconditioned response), but the bell does not. Yet, after
repeated pairings with food, the bell will cause salivation (the conditioned
response), even in the absence of food.
Conditioned responses are often physiologically preparatory and assist
in the body's effort to maintain homeostasis-an equilibrium across a
99
range of internal conditions such as body temperature and blood sugar.
For example, food cues (which may be visual, oral, spatial, or temporal)
initiate several specialized digestive processes that prepare the body for a
coming meal. Eating elevates glucose levels, causing the body to release
insulin. A cue that a meal is imminent triggers an insulin release in
advance, which dampens the food's effect on blood sugar. This learned
response results in tolerance, which means that achieving a hyperglycemic
effect in the future would require surprising the body by eating more than
usual or eating foods that are unusually high in sugar.
Similarly, drug cues prepare the body for ingestion of the drug. If rats
repeatedly receive morphine in the presence of a cue, the cue eventually
triggers increased sensitivity to pain. 100 This partially mitigates the
anesthetic effect of a subsequent morphine injection. This explains why
drug users are more likely to overdose when they take a drug
in an
10 1
environment that does not contain cues associated with past use.
Once a cue becomes associated with ingestion of a substance, the
presence of the cue in the absence of the substance can produce unpleasant
effects. 10 2 The cue triggers the adjustments that would restore homeostasis
if the person subsequently consumed the substance. So failure to consume

98.

For a discussion of classical conditioning, including Pavlov's dog experiment, see Todd R.

Schachtman et al., Effects of Conditioning in Advertising, in ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING AND
CONDITIONING THEORY 481, 481-82 (Todd R. Schachtman & Steve Reilly eds., 2011).
99.
The discussion in the text of cues and craving draws from material in Jeff Strnad,
Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax ": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
1221, 1248-50 (2005); David Laibson, A Cue-Theory of Consumption, 116 Q.J. ECON. 81, 84-86
(2001); and Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 243-45.
100.
Laibson, supra note 99, at 85.
101.
Id.
102.
Strnad, supra note 99, at 1249.

246

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

[Vol. 22:227

the substance has the opposite effect, causing a powerful craving for the
substance, the consumption of which may be needed to restore
homeostasis.
Loewenstein argues that cue-triggered

cravings

are the main

impediment to conquering addiction. 10 3 While addicts often experience

cravings associated with withdrawal automatically upon cessation of
consumption, tiese symptoms generally last for only a short period of time
and can sometimes be treated therapeutically, for example, with nicotine
replacement therapy. 0 4 Cues, on the other hand, can unexpectedly trigger

cravings even if an addict has abstained for a period of months or years.
This is because virtually any environmental cue that becomes associated
with drug use can trigger a craving. And deconditioning-that is, gradually
05
reducing the cue's power to cause cravings-is a slow process. 1
In addition, because cue-triggered cravings may occur unexpectedly,

they are a potential source of self-control problems. Addicts who seem to
have their addiction under control may encounter random cues that trigger
craving and relapse. In fact, Loewenstein argues that, with respect to
addictive drugs like nicotine, cue-triggered cravings can be so intense that
they overwhelm the will and cause addicts to use even if they would prefer

not to do so. 10 6 In that sense, the addicts' actions do not reflect their true
103.
Loewenstein, Addiction, supranote 66, at 243-45.
104.
See id at 244.
105. Id.at 245.
Id. at 259. B. Douglas Bemheim and Antonio Rangel propose a theory of addiction that is
106.
somewhat similar to the visceral factors perspective, except that it focuses on brain function. Bermheim
& Rangel, NonstandardDecision-Makers,supra note 50, at 45-57. See generally Bemheim & Rangel,
New Economic View, supra note 26; B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Addiction and CueTriggeredDecision Processes, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 1558 (2004) [hereinafter Bembeim & Rangel, CueTriggeredDecision Processes]. Bernheim and Rangel use evidence from neuroscience to argue that the
mesolimbic dopamine system ("MDS") of the brain functions as a hedonic (pleasure/pain) forecasting
mechanism. Bemheim & Rangel, Cue-Triggered Decision Processes, supra, at 1562-65. The MDS
learns to associate particular environmental cues (such as the smell of freshly baked cookies) and
choices (eating the cookies) with a post-choice experience (feeling full and satisfied). Id. at 1562. Under
normal conditions, the MDS learns to appropriately forecast the amount of pleasure or pain a person
will receive from a given choice. Id. at 1562-64. However, for addictive substances like nicotine,
Bernheim and Rangel argue that the MDS sometimes malfunctions. Addictive substances interfere with
the normal learning process by activating the MDS directly (independent of any pleasure experienced).
Id. at 1564. Because of this, cues associated with past consumption cause the MDS to forecast that
using a drug will result in much more pleasure than actually is the case. Id. In other words, the MDS
creates a powerful impulse to use the drug by literally tricking the brain. Bemheim & Rangel,
NonstandardDecision-Makers, supra note 50, at49. Note that Bemheim and Rangel do not argue that
all smoking is irrational. They also do not deny that people are drawn to smoking because of its hedonic
effects, and they assume that people can sometimes make rational choices about smoking. Id.But at
other times, random cues can drive a person to smoke irrationally.
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preferences. Moreover, while he expresses doubt about whether overeating
can be characterized as an addiction, Loewenstein also suggests that
10 7
visceral factors might cause people to eat irrationally.
C. PROJECTION BIAS

Making rational decisions often requires predicting future preferences.
Preferences may change over time due to factors like maturation, social
influences, and changes in affective states, habits, and environment.10 8 The
rational actor model assumes that we accurately forecast changes in our
preferences, but empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the

case. 109 More specifically, we appear to suffer from projection bias, which
is the tendency to project current preferences and any state that influences
current preferences into the future." 0 We understand that our preferences
shift in response to changing conditions, and we are generally adept at

predicting the direction of the change. For example, we realize that eating
will reduce our desire for food. However, we frequently underestimate the
magnitude of the change, so we exaggerate the degree to which our future
1
preferences will be similar to our current preferences.I '

The cold-to-hot empathy gap is an important source of projection
bias." 2 When we are in a cold state, we underestimate how our preferences
will change when in a hot state (for example, when craving nicotine)." 3
107.
Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 257-59; George Loewenstein, Emotions in
Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 426, 430 (2000). For a detailed
discussion of whether food can be addictive, see Stroad, supranote 99, at 1249-50.
108.
George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in Predicting
Future Utility, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1209-10 (2003) [hereinafter Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin,
ProjectionBias].
109.
Michael Conlin, Ted O'Donoghue & Timothy J. Vogelsang, Projection Bias in Catalog
Orders, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1217, 1217 (2007).
110.
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, Projection Bias, supra note 108, at 1210; George
Loewenstein, Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 96, 97 (2005)
[hereinafter Loewenstein, MedicalDecision Making 1].
111.
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, ProjectionBias, supra note 108, at 1210.
112.
Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making 1, supra note 110, at 97.
113.
George Loewenstein, Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps in Medical Decision Making, 24 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. S49, S49 (2005) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making 11]. Experience with
various hot states may mitigate this effect to some extent, but not completely. The reason seems to be
that we have a poor memory for hot states. When in a cold state, people find it difficult to imagine what
it would be like to be in a hot state in the future. Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 241-42.
When people imagine a visual image, they activate many of the same brain systems involved in visual
perception. In other words, people are, in a sense, "seeing" the scene in their minds. But when they
recall hot states such as pain, they seem unable to re-experience the hot state. Rather, they are more
likely to recall the circumstances that led to the experience rather than the feelings themselves. A
second reason for the cold-to-hot empathy gap is that optimism bias may cause us to overestimate our
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The cold-to-hot empathy gap may lead to excessive smoking and eating.
First, people contemplating smoking for the first time may overestimate
their ability to quit once they start, which could lead them to regret
smoking in the first place. 114 This mistake occurs because they have never

experienced the craving that results from addiction, so they cannot easily
imagine how they will react to it. Moreover, when people smoke for the

first time, they have no established smoking cues, so projection bias may
cause them to ignore the likelihood that continued smoking will create cues
that will trigger powerful cravings.1" 5 Second, healthy people may fail to

appreciate on an affective level how miserable sickness can be. 116 So they
may be too quick to engage in unhealthy behaviors such as smoking and
117
overeating.
ability to resist the influence of hot states. Id. at 241-2. For a discussion of optimism bias, see infra Part
IV.E.
114.
Michael Sayette et al., Exploring the Cold-to-Hot Empathy Gap in Smokers, 19 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 926, 930 (2008) [hereinafter Sayette et al., Empathy Gap in Smokers]; Loewenstein, Medical
Decision Making II, supra note 113, at S52-53; Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, ProjectionBias,
supra note 108, at 1232-33.
115.
See Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 246-47.
116.
Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making 1, supra note 110, at 101; Loewenstein, Medical
Decision Making It, supranote 113, at S52-53.
117.
Researchers have also identified a hot-to-cold empathy gap. When people are in a hot state,
they do not fully appreciate how their preferences will change once they cool off. Loewenstein, Medical
Decision Making II, supra note 113, at S49. Like the cold-to-hot empathy gap, the hot-to-cold empathy
gap may lead to excessive smoking and eating. People may give excessive weight to momentary hot
states. See id. at S52-53. For example, the nicotine-deprived smoker or hungry dieter may fail to fully
appreciate that their craving will eventually pass and that they will no longer feel as if they must have a
cigarette or eat a sugary snack. If a person incorrectly perceives that, unless satisfied, an intense craving
will continue unabated, that person may give in to the craving when he or she would not do so absent
this error in perception. Evidence supporting this hypothesis exists with respect to smoking. A study by
Michael Sayette and his colleagues finds that smokers who are experiencing an intense craving predict
that if they do not smoke within the next forty-five minutes, their urge to smoke will steadily increase.
But smokers experiencing cravings who actually sit in a room for forty-five minutes without smoking
do not report any actual increase in smoking urge. Sayette concludes that smokers experiencing
cravings who predict that their smoking urge will increase steadily over time are "overpredicting" their
urges. Michael Sayette et al., Effects of Smoking Urge on Temporal Cognition, 19 PSYCHOL.
ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 88, 90-91 (2005). This mistake could cause smokers to believe that quitting will be
more difficult than it actually is, which would reduce their willingness to abstain.
Similar evidence exists with respect to eating. Daniel Read and Barbara van Leeuwen asked
people to choose a snack that they would consume at a future time. Some study participants were
hungry at the time they made the choice, while other participants had recently eaten. The researchers
told the participants that they would receive the snack that they chose at a time in the future when they
would have recently eaten and would not be hungry. Nonetheless, people who were hungry when
making the choice were more likely to select an unhealthy snack than people who were not hungry
when making the choice. This suggests that the hungry participants projected their current hot state into
the future. Daniel Read & Barbara van Leeuwen, PredictingHunger: The Effects ofAppetite and Delay
on Choice, 76 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 189, 196-97 (1998). In addition, when the
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D.

HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING

Standard economic models usually assume that people place greater
weight on the present than on the future and that each person discounts
future costs and benefits using a discount factor.' 18 For example, a person
0.9 would be indifferent between receiving $100
with a discount factor of119
today.
$90
or
year
in one
Standard models also assume that people discount exponentially.
Exponential discounting means that a single discount factor applies to two
20
equidistant periods no matter how close to the present those periods are.t
Exponential discounting results in preferences that are consistent over time.
An exponential discounter who considers $100 in two years to be
equivalent to $90 in one year, would also consider $100 in one year to be
equivalent to $90 today.

However, certain findings are inconsistent with exponential
discounting. For example, a number of studies show that if people are
offered a choice between $100 in two years and $90 in one year, many will
choose the former, larger amount, demonstrating patience.121 But if you

researchers later revisited the participants to give them their snack, the researchers added a twist to the
experiment. Instead of simply giving the participants the snack that they had originally chosen, the
researchers again offered the participants a choice between a healthy and unhealthy snack. But this
time, the participants were choosing the snack for immediate consumption. All of the participants had
recently eaten. Interestingly, those participants who had chosen a healthy snack in the advance
condition were more likely to also choose a healthy snack for immediate consumption. This indicates
that people who promise to control themselves in the future are more likely to do so than those who do
not. Id. at 197-201. Although not conclusive, these findings suggest that projection bias may lead to
overeating. For example, when hungry, people may project their hunger into the future, causing them to
conclude that sticking to a diet is hopeless. Having reached this conclusion, they may be less likely to
plan to eat healthy. And when it comes time to eat, their lack of a plan to eat healthy may reduce their
chances of actually doing so. In effect, their prediction becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
118.
The discount rate (r), which may be more familiar to lawyers, is related to the discount
factor (6) as follows: r = (1- -) / 6. Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 913 n.23.
For a discussion of the role of discount factors in standard economic models and models involving
hyperbolic discounting, see id at 913-14.
119.
This example is based on the example found in Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem,
supra note 58, at 913. Discount factors may vary, reflecting the fact that some people are more patient
than others. Economists generally treat the discount factor as a matter of individual preference and do
not treat discounting as irrational. Id.; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky
Behaviors, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 645, 648 (1998). Some economists, however, argue that discounting is
non-normative, except to the extent that it reflects mortality risk. For a discussion of this view, see
Beshears, supra note 65, at 1791.
120.
See Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 913.
Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time
121.
Preference: A CriticalReview, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 360-61 (2002) (discussing these studies).
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offer a choice between $100 in one year and $90 today, some of those same
people will choose the latter, smaller amount, demonstrating impatience.
A possible explanation for these disparate results is that people engage
in hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting. With hyperbolic
discounting, the discount factor becomes smaller the closer the period in
question is to the present. 122 In other words, people are patient when
planning for the future, but impatient when making decisions about the
present.
If people discount more heavily in the short-run than in the long-run,
their preferences will be inconsistent at different points in time, making
them prone to preference reversals and self-control problems. For example,
at time t, a person might plan to quit smoking or to go on a diet at time
t + 1. The person makes this decision because, in discounting the health
consequences of smoking and obesity that will occur at time t + 2, the
person uses a large (patient) discount factor. This means that health
consequences will have significant weight. But when it comes time to give
up cigarettes or to start the diet (t + 1), the person discounts the future
using a smaller discount factor, places less weight on health consequences,
23
and decides to continue smoking or to break the diet. 1
Some patemalists interpret preference reversals of this type as
evidence of a conflict between a person's multiple selves. 124 The planning
self uses a large discount factor, assigns great weight to future utility, and
plans to stop smoking or to go on a diet. 125 But the acting self, which
controls behavior, uses a small discount factor, gives less weight to the
future, and fails to follow through on the plan. In other words, the acting
self is present-biased.

122.

Id. at 360.

123.
124.

GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 35, at 10.
Id.; Gruber, supra note 30, at 122.

125.

In discussing hyperbolic discounting, paternalists sometimes refer to a conflict between the

current self and the future self. Gruber & Kbszegi, Is Addiction Rational?,supra note 18, at 122. This

terminology can be confusing because as time passes, the future self becomes the current self. To
reduce confusion, I refer to the conflict as involving the planning self and the acting self. Differences in
terminology aside, what matters is that a conflict occurs because when a person is planning for the
future, the person places great weight on health consequences and plans to make healthy choices. But
when deciding how to act today, the person places less weight on the future and smokes or eats
unhealthy food. So the person's opinion about whether to pursue healthy choices depends on whether
he or she is making future plans (the planning self) or deciding how to act in the present (the acting
self).
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Paternalists generally argue that welfare ought to be determined with
respect to the wishes of the planning self; the wishes of the acting self
should be ignored.1 26 In other words, they claim that the planning self s
discount factor is normatively appropriate. By using a smaller discount
factor, the acting self "underweights" future costs and engages in unhealthy
behavior despite the fact that the planning self would prefer to be
healthy. 127 As a result, the acting self inflicts harm on the individual,
creating an internality, or intra-personal externality. 128 And just as
government intervention might be appropriate in the presence of interit might also be appropriate in the presence of
personal externalities,
29
internalities. 1
E. OPTIMISM BIAS
Rational decisions about risky behavior require an understanding of
the risks involved. If people do not understand these risks, the obvious
solution is to simply provide them with the necessary information. But a
number of studies suggest that excessive optimism may bias people's
ability to process that information. In general, people often claim that their
own abilities are above average and that the risk they face for various
hazards is lower than the risk faced by the average person.1 30 For example,
most people claim that they drive better than the average person.131 And far
more people claim that they are at below-average risk for contracting
pneumonia than at above-average risk. 132 Even if people accurately
estimate the risk that smoking or overeating imposes on others, optimism
bias might cause them to underestimate the risk to themselves.1 33 In other
words, people might smoke or overeat even though they are aware of the
risks because they do not believe that these risks apply to them personally.
In particular, optimism bias might explain the tendency to regret past
smoking and to underestimate addiction. If people smoke because they
think they will not suffer health damage, they may regret the decision when
126.
127.
128.

at 1263.
129.
Addiction
130.
131.
132.
133.

smoking).

See, e.g., GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 35, at 10.
Id. at 12-13.
Gruber, supra note 30, at 124-25; Gruber & Kbszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 18,

GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 35, at 12-13; Gruber & K6szegi, Is
Rational?,supranote 18, at 1263.
Neil D. Weinstein, OptimisticBiases about PersonalRisks, 246 ScI. 1232, 1232 (1989).
Viscusi, Paternalism,supra note 59, at 60.
Weinstein, supra note 130, at 1232.
See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 18, at 1186-88 (making this argument with respect to

252

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

[Vol. 22:227

they realize they were wrong. Additionally, people who are excessively
optimistic about their own abilities may wrongfully conclude that they are
134
not susceptible to addiction.
V. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF PSYCHIC TAXES
Part IV described several theories that explain why some people may
smoke or eat more than the optimal (utility-maximizing) amount. This Part
explains the potential benefits of psychic taxes assuming that people do in
fact smoke or eat irrationally. It also discusses whether graphic warnings
are superior to textual warnings and describes the empirical evidence
supporting the claim that graphic warnings will reduce smoking and
unhealthy eating.
A. THE THEORY UNDERLYING PSYCHIC TAXES
If people smoke or eat irrationally, then government intervention to
reduce smoking and curb eating could produce substantial benefits. In other
words, if failures of rationality lead to welfare-reducing mistakes, then that
creates a potentially compelling rationale for requiring graphic warnings
and other psychic taxes. By increasing the non-pecuniary cost of cigarettes
and unhealthy food, psychic taxes might make people better off in utility
terms.
To illustrate, assume that hyperbolic discounting causes the acting self
to irrationally ignore the future costs of unhealthy consumption. This leads
to a self-control problem resulting in excessive consumption of cigarettes
or food. By stimulating feelings of guilt and fear, a graphic warning might
impose an immediate psychic cost upon the acting self. In effect, this
psychic cost serves as a proxy for the future health costs that the acting self
would otherwise ignore. In this way, a graphic warning might help a person
overcome a self-control problem and carry out the wishes of his or her
planning self. Similarly, psychic taxes might mitigate the problems caused
by optimism bias and other failures of rationality.
However, the preceding analysis comes with an important caveat. If
the goal is to maximize social welfare, then the government's task is not
necessarily to minimize consumption of harmful goods. The fact that some
people behave irrationally some of the time does not mean that all
unhealthy consumption is irrational. It is possible, for example, that some

134.

See Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 242.
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people might rationally trade off the costs of unhealthy eating (weight gain)
in exchange for the benefits (eating tasty foods).
So rather than minimizing unhealthy consumption, the government
should attempt to achieve the optimal level of consumption-that is, the
amount of consumption that would take place if people were perfectly
rational. In other words, government intervention should eliminate
irrational consumption without interfering with rational consumption.
Using hyperbolic discounting as an example, the government's role should
be to eliminate any smoking or eating of which the planning self does not
approve. But if the planning self wishes to smoke or to indulge in a dessert,
then the government should not interfere.
If optimal consumption-not eliminating consumption-is the goal,
then government intervention could go too far. For example, if psychic
taxes deter rational consumption, then people might consume too few
unhealthy goods. In other words, psychic taxes may make us healthier, but
at the same time, reduce our utility. Psychic taxes could cause us to avoid
consuming goods that we would otherwise rationally find beneficial in
spite of the potential health costs.

B. GRAPHIC WARNINGS VERSUS TEXTUAL WARNINGS
Assuming that the government determines that it wants to impose a
psychic tax using warning labels, then that begs the question: should the
warnings be graphic or textual? The textual warnings that currently appear
on cigarette packages likely have only a small psychic effect. Most
smokers are probably too familiar with the existing warnings to pay much
attention to them. 35 Similarly, consumers may not notice or may have
trouble interpreting nutritional information presented in srfall print on the
back of food packages.' 3 6 Replacing or supplementing textual warnings
with highly conspicuous images of cancerous lungs or drawings of obese
persons would likely impose a larger psychic cost.
One reason that graphic warnings may impose large psychic costs is
that they might trigger an emotional reaction to potential health risks. In
coping with risks, the rational actor model assumes that people process

135.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,529-31
(proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
136.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CALORIES COUNT: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OBESITY
17 (2004).
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risks cognitively and that they focus exclusively on consequences. 137 In
particular, people calculate the expected utility of each potential choice.
Expected utility equals the utility of all possible outcomes weighted by
each outcome's probability.138 For example, the expected utility of
smoking would include the utility loss due to lung cancer, taking into
account the probability of contracting the disease. If real people behaved
according to this model, then a graphic warning would offer no advantage
over a waming that simply listed risks along with their probabilities. 139 But
the evidence suggests that the way in which people actually respond to risk
is not simply a function of their cognitive evaluation of likely
consequences.
More specifically, George Loewenstein and his colleagues argue that,
in some instances, the emotions elicited by a risky decision may exercise
140
more influence over behavior than cognitive assessments of risk.
Loewenstein also argues that emotional reactions to risk may depend on
factors that play little or no role in cognitive processing. 141 While cognitive
risk assessments likely focus on expected utility, emotional reactions
depend largely upon mental images of future outcomes. 142 So by making
risks vivid and easy to imagine, graphic warnings may trigger an emotional
response that textual warnings do not. As a result, graphic warnings may
increase the likelihood that people will attempt to avoid certain risks.
Graphic warnings might also impose a large psychic cost through
classical conditioning. Marketing experts have long relied on classical

137. For a discussion of the standard economic model of risky choices, see DAVID BESANKO &
RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 556-58 (2d ed. 2005), and George Loewenstein et al.,
Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001) [hereinafter Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings].

138.

A rational actor might also discount the utility of future outcomes using his or her personal

discount factor.

139. This conclusion might not apply if, as some scholars argue, people use an availability
heuristic in estimating risks. According to these scholars, contrary to standard models, people do not
estimate risks based on their actual statistical probabilities. Instead, people estimate risks based on how
easily examples come to mind. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law,
35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203-04 (2006). In that case, by making risks more salient, graphic warnings

might exploit the availability heuristic and increase estimates for certain risks. This would make graphic
warnings particularly effective at counteracting optimism bias. Assume, for instance, that optimism bias
causes a smoker to underestimate the risk of getting lung cancer by 50 percent. By making the risk more
salient, a graphic warning on a cigarette package might cause the smoker to double that estimate. In that
case, the perception of the risk would match reality. Notice that the reason for taking advantage of the
availability heuristic is to correct biased risk estimates, not necessarily to impose psychic costs.
140.
141.

Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, supranote 137, at 274.
Id. at 271.

142.

Id.
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conditioning to associate their products with positive emotions. 143 Graphic
warnings may have the opposite effect. In other words, they may condition
people to experience negative emotions when presented with a particular
product. For example, if a candy bar wrapper contains a red label or a
drawing of an obese person, then, after repeated exposure, people might
associate the candy bar with obesity and have a negative reaction to it.
Conditioning people to experience guilt from eating unhealthy food
could be especially effective in modifying behavior. Guilt arises because of
the conflicting desire for both short-term gratification and long-term
preservation of health. 144 Additionally, food research shows that guilt plays
an important role in determining how much people eat. 145 For example,
labels that make food appear healthier, such as "low-fat" labels, reduce the
amount of guilt that people feel when consuming the food and
simultaneously increase the amount consumed. 146 As a result, by
manipulating feelings of guilt, graphic warnings may channel consumption
choices in the direction that the government deems appropriate.
C.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GRAPHIC WARNINGS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Ultimately, whether graphic warnings reduce unhealthy consumption
is an empirical question. Unfortunately, the existing empirical evidence is
not conclusive.
With respect to smoking, people pay more attention to graphic
warnings on cigarette packages than to textual warnings. 147 Graphic
warnings may also increase perceptions of the health risks associated with
smoking, and some smokers report that graphic warnings cause them to
think more about quitting. 148 But even the FDA concedes that "there is
large uncertainty about the size of the effect" that graphic warnings will
have on the smoking rate. 149 The reason for this uncertainty is the lack of
evidence that graphic warnings actually cause smokers to quit or

143.

For a discussion of classical conditioning and advertising, see generally Schachtman et al.,

supranote 98.
144.
Brian Wansink & Pierre Chandon, Can "Low-Fat" Nutrition Labels Lead to Obesity?, 43 J.

MARKETING RES. 605, 607 (2006).
145.

Id.

146. Id. at 609-10.
147.
For a review of the literature, see Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,529 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
148. Id. at 69,532.
149.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,712 (June
22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
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discourage nonsmokers from starting to smoke. 50 One reason for this lack
of evidence is that countries that have adopted graphic cigarette warnings
have often done so at or near the same time that they increased cigarette
taxes or adopted restrictions on smoking in public.' 51 The adoption of
graphic warnings in a particular country may also coincide with an increase
in antismoking sentiment in that country. This means that we cannot
conclude that any reduction in the smoking rate following the
implementation of graphic warnings is attributable to the warnings
themselves.
Research about the effectiveness of graphic warnings on food is still in
its early stages. 152 A number of studies suggest that graphic warnings
(particularly traffic-light color-coding) assist people in identifying healthier
foods. 153 There is also some evidence that graphic warnings influence food
purchases.154 For example, Anne Thorndike and her colleagues recently
studied the effect that traffic-light color-coding has on food-purchasing
decisions. 155 The study took place in the cafeteria of a large hospital. The
researchers labeled foods and beverages sold in the cafeteria with green,
yellow, and red labels. 156 Signage in the cafeteria explained "that green
meant 'consume often,' yellow meant 'consume less often,' and red meant
'there is a better choice in green or yellow."" 5 7 The researchers also made
a dietician available to answer questions about the labeling and supplied
pamphlets explaining the labeling. Relative to baseline sales, the study
found that sales of all red items decreased 9.2 percent, and sales of red
beverages decreased 16.5 percent. 158 Conversely, sales of all green items
increased 4.5 percent, and sales of green beverages increased 9.6
59
percent.1

150.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("FDA has
not provided a shred of evidence ... showing that the graphic warnings will 'directly advance' its
interest in reducing the number of Americans who smoke.").
151.
See id.
152. For a recent review of the empirical literature, see generally Kristy L. Hawley et al., The
Science on Front-of-PackageFood Labels, 22 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1 (2012). See also INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, FRONT-OF-PACKAGE NUTRITION RATINGS SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: PROMOTING

HEALTHIER CHOICES 43-70 (Ellen A. Wartella et al. eds., 2012).
153. Hawley et al., supranote 152, at 4-5.
154. Id. at 5 (reviewing the literature, but noting that "[Il]ittle research exists on the impact [that]
labeling systems have on purchasing patterns").
155. See generally Thomdike, supranote 14.
156. Id.at 527-29.
157. Id. at 529.
158. Id.at529-31.
159. Id.
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The Thorndike study suggests that traffic-light color-coding might
encourage healthier eating. But given the highly structured nature of the
experiment, we cannot safely conclude that a government-mandated
labeling scheme implemented on a national scale will produce similar
results. Also, the Thorndike study does not demonstrate that traffic-light
color-coding reduces overweight and obesity. As discussed in the next Part,
even if a labeling scheme increases purchases of healthier foods, consumers
may compensate in ways that undermine the expected health benefits, for
example, by eating larger portions. As a result, the net effect may be that
people lose little or no weight.
VI. REASONS FOR SKEPTICISM
As discussed in Part V, if people smoke or eat irrationally, psychic
taxes may produce substantial benefits. Despite these potential benefits,
there are a number of reasons to be skeptical. This Part explains why
psychic taxes may be both unnecessary and harmful.
A. THE BURDEN ON AUTONOMY

Perhaps the most popular objection to paternalistic intervention is that
it unjustifiably interferes with individual autonomy. 6 ' This Subpart
explains why autonomy is important and how psychic taxes burden it.
1. Why Autonomy Is Important
For paternalists, autonomy may seem unimportant. After all,
paternalists believe that people sometimes reduce their own utility by
behaving irrationally.' 6 1 Why should the government leave people free to
harm themselves?
One reason not to burden autonomy is that even if some people are
irrational some of the time, that does not mean that all people are irrational
all of the time. As explained in Subpart E of this Part, people are
heterogeneous with respect to rationality. And many people will often be in
a better position than the government to make choices that maximize their
own utility simply because they know more about their own preferences.' 62
For example, you may be in a better position than the government to
determine for yourself whether the enjoyment that you receive from eating

160.
See,
e.g.,
Paternalism,
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patemalism (last revised Jan. 1, 2010).
161.
Camerer et al., supranote 17, at 1212.
162.
Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 922.
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a bowl of ice cream is worth the cost in terms of weight gain. So your
consumption of ice cream may be rational, and the government will make
you worse off if it interferes.
But even when people behave irrationally, it may be better to respect
their autonomy and force them to live with their mistaken choices. First,
people may value the freedom to make choices even if those choices are
sometimes wrong. 163 In other words, the ability to choose may create utility
independent of the consequences of a given choice. 164 Second, decision
making is a skill that improves with experience. In the long run, people
may be better off if the government allows them to make mistakes and
learn from them.165 Third, as discussed in Subpart C of this Part, willpower
is a faculty that, over a long period, strengthens with use. 166 If the
government tightly controls people's choices, it will reduce opportunities to
exercise willpower. Over time, this may erode willpower and leave people
more vulnerable to temptation, which may in turn make further government
67
intervention necessary. 1
Paternalists might respond that these rationales for respecting
autonomy are limited. 168 When irrational choices have serious adverse
consequences-as may be the case for smoking and eating-it might be
better for the government to act to avoid those consequences. In that case,
government intervention might be desirable even if it means restricting our
freedom, preventing us from learning from our mistakes, and eroding our
willpower. Nonetheless, given the benefits of autonomy, the government
arguably should not burden it without compelling evidence that doing so
will improve social welfare.

163.
Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism,84 VA. L. REV. 229, 239-40 (1998) (discussing
this possibility).
164.
For a discussion of this claim, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2007) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism]. Blumenthal argues

that choosing does not always create utility, that people sometimes prefer not to have to make choices,
and that having too many choices can make decisions difficult. He suggests "that for various choices
and for some people there may be some optimal number of choices." See also Botti & Iyengar, supra
note 54, at 25-34 (reviewing the evidence that freedom to choose produces significant benefits, but also
arguing that having more choices is sometimes detrimental).
165.
See generally Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality:
Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1620 (2006).
166.
See infra Part VI.C.
167.
Cf Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1392-93 (2011) ("If exerting

willpower makes one better at it, then efforts to avoid temptations altogether may prove
counterproductive.").
168.

See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism,64 FLA. L. REv. 721, 725-26 (2012).
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Autonomy and Consumer Manipulation

To justify interference with autonomy, paternalists often point to
instances where firms attempt to manipulate consumers, perhaps by taking
169
advantage of cognitive biases or by provoking emotional responses.

Firms have an incentive to use sophisticated techniques to persuade
consumers to engage in behavior that will increase profits, even at the
expense of consumer welfare. For instance, firms may run advertisements
that contain little information. The advertisements instead try to condition
consumers to feel positively toward the product by associating it with
pleasant images and other stimuli. 70 A famous example is the use of the

Marlboro man to promote cigarette sales.' 71 Similarly, fast food restaurants
offer supersized portions in spite of172evidence that people tend to eat more
when eating out of large containers.

While arguments based on consumer manipulation are not without
merit, their appeal as a justification for paternalism is limited. One reason
is that consumers may be aware of and may take steps to thwart any efforts
to manipulate them.' 7 3 A second reason is that, in some cases, firms may
simply be giving consumers what they want. 174 For example, fast food

restaurants may offer supersized portions because their customers demand
them. 175 A third reason is that the type of advertising paternalists find

For a detailed discussion of consumer manipulation, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
169.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630,
724-42 (1999). For a review of the literature on consumer manipulation related to food choices, see
Pratt, supra note 45, at 103-06. See also Blumenthal, EmotionalPaternalism,supra note 164, at 47-49;
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Easy Way, supranote 4, at 202; E. Katherine Battle & Kelly D. Brownell,
Confronting a Rising Tide of EatingDisorders and Obesity: Treatment vs. Prevention and Policy, 21
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 755, 761 (1996).
170.
Hanson & Kysar, supranote 169, at 732-33.
Id.
171.
172.
See supra Part IV.A.
173.
Gregory Mitchell has noted that as we age, we may "become more resistant to manipulation
of our judgments and choices." Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should
Not Be Tradedfor Behavioral Law and Economics" Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 158 (2002)
[hereinafter Mitchell, Equal Incompetence]. To support this conclusion, Mitchell cites research finding
that older adults are less prone than college-age subjects to exhibit irregular preferences as a result of
context effects. Id. at 158 n.273. Context effects occur when a subject chooses product A from products
A and B, but chooses product B from products A, B, and C. Id
174.
WANSINK, MINDLESS EATING, supra note 77, at 196-99.
175.
Cf Joel Stein, Big Chain Restaurants'New Small Portions, TIME, May 10, 2007, available
=
1619548 ("When Ruby
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1619548,00.html?artld
Tuesday tried to position itself as the healthy chain restaurant by cutting back on serving sizes and
printing nutritional info on its menus in 2004, customers hated it so much, the small sizes were dropped
within five months.").
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objectionable might actually enhance consumers' enjoyment of the
advertised product. 176 This hypothesis is supported by a study of
preferences for Pepsi and Coke. 177 As part of the study, neuroscientists had
participants taste Pepsi and Coke while having their brain activity
monitored by a functional magnetic resonance imaging machine. In the
anonymous condition, participants did not know which soda they were
drinking. Under these circumstances, participants were divided equally in
their preference for Pepsi and Coke, and the two brands activated the same
area of the brain.17 8 In the semi-anonymous condition, the researchers gave
the participants a drink after informing them whether it was Pepsi or
Coke. 179 The researchers then gave the participants a second drink but told
them that the second drink could be either Pepsi or Coke.' 8° In reality, the
first drink and the second drink were the same (both were either Pepsi or
Coke). In this case, participants exhibited a strong preference for the first
drink when they knew that drink was Coke. In other words, participants
chose the drink that they knew was Coke over the unlabeled second drink,
even though the unlabeled drink was also Coke.' 8' Interestingly,
participants did not exhibit a similar bias in favor of the first drink when
they knew that drink was Pepsi. 182 Moreover, when the participants knew
that they were drinking Coke, activity occurred in areas of the brain
associated with working memory and the use of emotion to modify
behavior. 183 Participants who knew they were drinking Pepsi did not
84
exhibit similar brain activity.'
One interpretation of these findings is that the advantage that Coke has
over Pepsi is because of the ability of Coke's advertising to create
associations that activate higher-order brain mechanisms.' 85 More
generally, rather than simply manipulating people, advertising may actually
enhance the consumption experience and result in increased utility.

176.
See generally Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of BehavioralPreferencefor
Culturally FamiliarDrinks, 44 NEURON 379 (2004).
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 381,384-85.
179.
Id. at 380, 382-83.
180.
Id. at 380.
181.
Id. at 385.
182.
Id.
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 166-68 (rev. ed. 2009) (drawing this conclusion).
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3. Do Psychic Taxes Burden Autonomy?
In an effort to convince those who value autonomy to embrace
paternalistic policies, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, two prominent
paternalists, advocate what they call "libertarian paternalism," which
involves the use of nudges to modify behavior.' 8 6 Nudges are policies that
187
help the irrational while imposing only small costs on the rational.
Nudges stand in contrast to heavy-handed policies such as bans and sin
taxes. An example is changing the default rule for employer-provided
88
retirement plans so that employers automatically enroll new employees.'
The rationale for this arrangement is that it increases saving by overcoming
the irrational tendency to procrastinate with respect to filling out the
paperwork required to join the plan.' 89 At the same time, the arrangement
does not significantly burden those who rationally prefer not to save for
retirement because these people can easily opt out. 190
Paternalists might argue that psychic taxes are more akin to a gentle
nudge rather than a forceful shove and that they do not impose a significant
burden on the autonomy of rational persons. After all, unlike bans and sin
taxes, graphic warnings do not create a legal or financial barrier to
consumption. So rational consumers can access the goods they want despite
any warning label that the government might require.
Moreover, in some cases, graphic warnings arguably facilitate rational
decision making. For example, many consumers presumably want to eat
healthy food at least as long as the food tastes good. So food manufacturers
have an incentive to lead consumers to believe that certain foods are
healthy, even if they in fact are not. Requiring manufacturers to provide
consumers with textual and numerical information about the contents of
food might mitigate this problem, but that information might also be too
difficult for some consumers to process. In that case, a graphic warning
might assist consumers who want to eat healthy food. Placing a red label on

186,
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-6 (rev. ed., 2009).
187.

Id. at 6.

188.
Id. at 109-11.
189.
Id.
190.
In fact, automatic enrollment may burden rational employees. Many employers match the
contributions made by employees to their retirement accounts. Presumably, matching funds are finite.
So by increasing enrollment in retirement plans, automatic enrollment will result in the reallocation of a

portion of these funds from those who would have enrolled in the absence of automatic enrollment to
those who enroll only because of automatic enrollment. Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalismis
an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245, 1273 (2005).
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a particular food product, for example, would allow consumers to
determine with minimal effort that the government deems the food
unhealthy. So the label would arguably empower consumers by providing
them with information that would allow them to make informed choices
consistent with their preferences.
Nonetheless, those who value autonomy have two reasons to be
concerned about graphic warnings. First, by drawing attention to particular
potential consequences of a choice, graphic warnings may induce bad
decisions because of the focusing illusion. Focusing illusion describes our
tendency to overestimate the importance of whatever our attention is
directed towards.19 1 When we focus on a particular aspect of a situation, we
may ignore other aspects that are even more significant. For example, if a
graphic warning reminds us that eating a particular food might lead to
obesity, we may place too much emphasis on this point and ignore the fact
that the food tastes good and perhaps should be enjoyed at least on
occasion. 192

Second, in addition to providing information, graphic warnings also
impose a psychic cost. The cost imposed varies by the type of intervention.
Traffic-light color-coding likely imposes a lower psychic cost than
warnings that incorporate corpses or drawings of obese people. But even
traffic-light color-coding may stimulate feelings of guilt and anxiety. These
negative feelings might reduce utility. A person who consumes the product
despite the warning will receive less pleasure than otherwise. Also, some
people may decide not to consume the product despite the fact that absent
the warning, the benefits of consumption would outweigh the costs, making
consumption the rational choice. If that occurs, then the warning results in
a loss of consumer surplus.' 93 In that sense, graphic warnings do in fact
burden autonomy.

191.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be HappierIf You Were Richer? A Focusing
Illusion, 312 SCI. 1908, 1908 (2006).
192.
Cf On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2114-15 (2008) ("[P]roviding better and clearer

information in an attempt to override biases may [result in an] overemphasis of decision dimensions
that previously would not have been salient, but are now clearly visible and likely to attract undue
attention.").
193.
Consumer surplus is "the amount a buyer is willing to pay for a good minus the amount the
buyer actually pays for it," and it measures the benefit to the consumer of undertaking a market
transaction. MANKIW, supra note 17, at 139.
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194
Moreover, unlike a sin tax, graphic warnings do not raise revenue.
If a sin tax fails to modify behavior, consumers incur a cost. They buy the
taxed good and pay the tax. However, the cost to consumers is at least
partially offset by the revenue raised. The government can use this revenue
to provide benefits to other people. On the other hand, if a graphic warning
fails to modify behavior, the psychic cost that consumers sustain does not
produce a corresponding benefit for anyone else. Instead, it represents what
an economist would refer to as a deadweight loss or a net reduction in
welfare. 195

Finally, those who smoke or overeat despite graphic warnings may
suffer from a double-cost problem. 196 They experience the psychic cost that
the warnings are designed to create. But because the warnings do not affect
their behavior, they also suffer the health damage that the warnings are
supposed to help them avoid.
B.

LACK OF A CLEAR NORMATIVE STANDARD

As discussed in Parts IV and V, one of the primary rationales for
paternalism, including psychic taxes, is that people suffer from self-control
problems. People sometimes plan to quit smoking or to eat healthy foods
but fail to follow through. This begs the question: are people really better
off when they stick to their long-term plans, or should they sometimes
deviate from those plans and engage in seemingly short-sighted behavior?
Paternalists generally accept that people would be better off if they
followed through on their long-term plans. For example, as mentioned in
Part IV, paternalistic proposals based on hyperbolic discounting assume
that the planning self's preferences, which are based on its patient discount
factor, have normative priority over the acting self's preferences, which are
based on its impatient discount factor. 97 Similarly, proponents of the
visceral factors perspective sometimes argue that we are acting against our
true preferences when we make plans while in a cold state but then, while

194.

See Glaeser, supra note 4, at 135 (making this observation with respect to psychic taxes

generally).
195.

See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Easy Way, supra note 4, at 202 (noting that, when

government interventions stimulate guilt and fear but do not successfully modify behavior, those
interventions "merely impose additional costs on people").
196.
Cf Stmad, supra note 99, at 1254-55 (discussing a similar problem in the context of food
taxes); Fennell, supra note 167, at 1412 (noting this problem with respect to sin taxes).
197.
GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 35, at 10. For a detailed discussion of the

normatively appropriate discount factor for hyperbolic discounters, see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge
Problem,supra note 58, at 924-28.

264

Southern CaliforniaInterdisciplinaryLaw Journal

[Vol. 22:227

in a hot state, take actions that conflict with those plans. 98 If this view is
correct, the government may be justified in adopting policies such as
psychic taxes that facilitate implementation of our long-term plans.
199
But our long-term plans may not always be in our best interest.
Specifically, we may adopt plans that are too austere. One reason for this is
projection bias. 200 For example, we may resolve to eat five hundred fewer
calories tomorrow because, having already eaten today, we do not fully
appreciate how difficult it will be to deprive ourselves in the future.
More specifically, the intensity of visceral factors such as hunger
depends in part on the proximity of cues and other environmental
stimuli. 20 1 In this context, proximity includes many dimensions-

geographic, visual, temporal, and social. Food, for instance, is more likely
to stimulate hunger if it is visible, immediately attainable, or being eaten by
someone else. 2 2 This means that the intensity of visceral factors can
change rapidly. If projection bias results in failure to anticipate these
changes, we may plan to diet only to have those plans undermined by
20 3
unexpected visceral factors.

When this happens, we could interpret the outcome in multiple ways.
On the one hand, we could conclude that visceral factors undermined our

true preferences and caused us to act against our self-interest. On the other
hand, we could conclude that we had better information about our hot state

at the time we deviated from the diet-that is, we better understood the
pain of going hungry when we experienced hunger. 20 4 Moreover, hunger
itself may increase the pleasure derived from eating, which is something
we may fail to fully appreciate unless we are actually hungry.20 5 In that

198.
See, e.g., Loewenstein, Addiction, supra note 66, at 259.
199.
For related discussions of this problem, see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra
note 58, at 924-31, and Daniel Read, Which Side Are You On? The Ethics of Self-Command, 27 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 681, 685-86 (2006).
200.
See Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, ProjectionBias, supra note 108, at 1233.
201.
George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative
Processes in Economic Behavior 10-11 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits]; George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue,
The Heat of the Moment: Modeling Interactions Between Affect and Deliberation 10-13 (June 2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
202.
See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits, supranote 201, at 9-10.
203.
Loewenstein, Out of Control, supra note 91, at 278-79, 286-89.
204.
Read, supra note 199, at 685-86. Cf Sayette et al., Empathy Gap in Smokers, supra note
114, at 931 (reviewing evidence that smokers who are not currently experiencing intense cravings are
unrealistic about their chances of abstaining from cigarettes).
205.
See Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 930-31.
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case, abandoning the diet at the last minute could be the utility-maximizing
choice.
A second and related reason that long-term plans may be too austere is
that the opportunity costs associated with forward-looking goals may
become more salient as the moment of choice approaches.20 6 For example,
we may not fully appreciate the opportunity cost of dieting until the waiter
offers us a piece of chocolate cake. To support this hypothesis, Shane
Frederick and his colleagues find that, contrary to standard economic
theory, consumers
often ignore opportunity costs unless those costs are
7
made explicit.

20

Similarly, the salience of various features of an event or action may
change over time. 2 8 Specifically, when planning in advance, we focus on
abstract, general, and de-contextualized features of events. We also focus
on the reasons for taking a particular action. 20 9 For example, when
pondering whether to start a diet next week, we may focus on how
attractive we will be once we lose weight. But when it comes time to
implement the plan, our focus is likely to shift from the abstract reasons for
taking the action to the specific, concrete steps that the action requiresthat is, the "how" rather than the "why." 2 10 Suddenly, we will become very
aware that starting the diet today means eating salad for lunch instead of
pizza. Under these circumstances, is deviating from the diet necessarily a
bad choice? Or does it simply reflect a justifiable change in perspective?
Despite these considerations, a paternalist might argue that we must be
better off when we follow through on our long-term plans. After all, we
often experience regret when we fail to do so. But regret may not be a very
reliable indicator of true preferences. Instead, regret may be due to
projection bias. When in a cold state (for example, shortly after eating),
people may not be in a good position to evaluate choices that they made

206.
207.
(2009).

Id. at 928.
See generally Shane Frederick et al., Opportunity Cost Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 553

208.
Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 405-06
(2003); George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85, 94-98 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1999).
209.
Trope & Liberman, supra note 208, at 405-10.
210.
Id.
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while in a hot state (when hungry).2 1 Moreover, some research suggests
that, as time passes, regret about indulgence fades. 2 12 As they get older,
people instead express regret about their failure to seize the pleasures of
life. 213 This change in perspective may be due to a change in the salience of
relevant aspects of the decision, which may occur with the passage of
time. 214
Ultimately, when people's short-term and long-term preferences come
into conflict, paternalism requires the government to give normative status
to one set of preferences. While our intuition may suggest that the
government should always side with long-term preferences, that conclusion
may reflect prejudice more than reasoned argument. If so, then psychic
taxes and other forms of paternalism become suspect. Paradoxically, by
helping us achieve our long-term goals, paternalism may in fact make us
worse off.215
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF SELF-REGULATION

Even if we are better off when we stick to our long-term plans,
psychic taxes and other forms of paternalism may be unnecessary. Many of
us are aware of our self-control problems, so we have developed various
strategies to help us reach our long-term goals. These strategies reduce the
need for government intervention.
One strategy involves commitment devices. 216 Commitment devices
may impose a short-term cost on the acting self, which makes them
particularly useful for hyperbolic discounters. For example, smokers
sometimes announce to family and friends that they will not smoke again,
making a relapse embarrassing. Commitment devices, such as not keeping

211.
Cf Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 928 (arguing that feelings of
guilt are an unreliable indicator of true preferences, because guilt is itself a hot state that fades with
time).
212.
Ran Kivetz & Anat Keinan, Repenting Hyperopia: An Analysis of Self-Control Regrets, 33 J.
CONSUMER RES., 273, 274-82 (2006).

213.
Id. at 282 (concluding that "consumers sometimes suffer from excessive farsightedness" and
"repent hyperopia in the long run").
See Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 208, at 97.
214.
See Kivetz & Keinan, supra note 212, at 282 ("We conclude by noting that, although ex ante
215.
consumers perceive virtue as providing long-term benefits and vice as entailing delayed costs, myopia
may be farsighted after all. In the long run, indulging can lead to less regret and more satisfaction.").
See generally Bryan, Karlan & Nelson, supra note 53. For a discussion of the use of
216.
commitment devices by smokers, see Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction "Rational?", supra note 18, at
1278.
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cigarettes or snacks in the home, may also help people avoid temptation,
reducing the influence of visceral factors.
A second strategy is the use of personal rules, such as, "I will eat
dessert only on weekends." 2 17 Personal rules can be effective because they
link together a series of choices. 21 8 To illustrate, imagine that a person is
composed of the current self and a series of future selves, including
tomorrow's self. Tomorrow's self may be willing to follow a rule that
requires resisting temptation but only if future selves will also follow the
rule. 2 19 After all, why should tomorrow's self abstain from smoking or
eating dessert if future selves will not? The current self also prefers that
future selves follow the rule, but the current self would like to break the
rule today. However, the current self knows that, in determining whether
future selves are likely to follow the rule, tomorrow's self will use the past
as a guide.2 2 ° So if the current self violates the rule today, this violation will
establish a dangerous precedent. 22 1 Today's breach will undermine the
confidence that tomorrow's self has in the ability of future selves to
exercise self-control, reducing the incentive tomorrow's self has to follow
the rule. The desire to avoid a dangerous precedent creates a powerful
motive for the current self to follow the rule today.
A third strategy involves the use of negative emotions: we can train
ourselves to feel guilty when we give in to temptation. 222 Guilt creates an
immediate cost for indulging in unhealthy activities, the long-term damage
from which we might otherwise ignore. 223 Finally, a fourth strategy
involves distraction techniques. Research suggests that people can delay
gratification longer when they distract themselves from the source of
224
temptation by engaging in or thinking about unrelated activities.

217.

See Roland B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic

Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: VOLUME ONE: RATIONALITY AND WELL-

BEING 137, 151-59 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan Carrillo eds., 2002) [hereinafter B~nabou & Tirole, SelfRegulation]. See generally Roland B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and PersonalRules, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 848 (2004) (providing a formal model of the use of personal rules).
218.
See B6nabou & Tirole, Self-Regulation, supra note 217, at 151-59.
219.
See id. at 154-55.
Id.
220.
221.
Id. at 155.
222.
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Easy Way, supra note 4, at 183.
223.
Id.
224.
See Walter Mischel, Ozlem Ayduk & Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, Sustaining Delay of
Gratification Over Time: A Hot/Cool Systems Perspective, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 175, 183-87 (George Loewenstein et al.

eds., 2003) (reviewing the literature on the role of distraction).
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Although commitment devices, personal rules, negative emotions,
distraction techniques, and similar strategies may facilitate self-control,
they are not perfect. One problem is that projection bias and optimism bias
may cause people to overestimate their ability to withstand temptation.
Consequently, people may not take appropriate steps to avoid tempting
situations. 22 5 For example, a smoker who is trying to quit may not
realize
226
up.
light
to
urge
powerful
a
trigger
will
bar
smoky
a
that sitting in
If self-control strategies fail, we may still resist temptation-even
without government assistance-through the exercise of willpower.
Willpower is a resource that allows deliberative processes to control
behavior despite the influence of the visceral factors triggered by
temptation. 227 Imagine a dieter who attends a lunch meeting and comes
face-to-face with a large tray of cookies. Although the dieter will likely be
tempted to eat a cookie, willpower may allow him or her to overcome the
temptation.
Nonetheless, willpower is a limited resource. Some studies suggest
that willpower is like a muscle. 228 In the short term, it weakens with use.
Our dieter may initially put up a fight, but the longer he or she is in the
same room as the cookie tray, the more difficult it becomes to resist
temptation. Moreover, temptation is not the only factor that can undermine
willpower. Stress can also lead to unexpected lapses in self-control.22 9
Similarly, performing even simple mental tasks can adversely affect
230
willpower.
In sum, self-regulation mitigates self-control problems and reduces the
need for psychic taxes and other governmental solutions to irrationality.
However, self-regulation is not a panacea, nor does it completely eliminate
the potential benefits of paternalism.
D.

OFFSETTING FAILURES OF RATIONALITY

As we have seen, paternalists base their argument for government
intervention on evidence that smoking and overeating are caused by

225.
226.
227.

See, e.g., Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making ll, supra note 113, at S49.
Sayette et al., Empathy Gap in Smokers, supranote 114, at 931.
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits, supra note 201, at 2.

228.

For a recent review of this literature, see generally Martin S. Hagger, Chantelle Wood &

Chris Stiff, Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 495 (2010).
229.
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits, supranote 201, at 11-13.
230.
Id.
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failures of rationality. But failures of rationality do not necessarily reduce
utility. Instead, one failure of rationality may offset another. 23 1 This means
that government intervention that corrects a given source of irrationality
without correcting all others has ambiguous effects on welfare.
Consider, for example, the finding that people overestimate highly
publicized risks. 232 Consistent with this finding, many people-including
both smokers and nonsmokers-overestimate the risks of smoking. 233 This
reduces smoking from the level that would otherwise prevail.234 The bias
that leads people to overestimate smoking's risks may partially, fully, or
more than fully offset any excessive smoking resulting from other failures
of rationality.23 5 If so, that would reduce the potential scope for
government intervention.
A related example involves the possibility that thin people may
underestimate their ability to adapt to gaining weight. Substantial research
suggests that people adapt to adverse events so that the events often have
little or no effect on their reported happiness. 236 People exhibit remarkable
adaptation even to serious disabilities such as paraplegia. 237 Nonetheless,
people tend to underestimate the degree to which they will adapt.2 38 People
tend to predict that adverse events will affect them much more than
actually seems to be the case, probably due to projection bias. If, by failing
to fully appreciate the power of adaptation, thin people substantially
overestimate the miseries of being overweight, then they may eat less (or
exercise more) than they otherwise would. This could offset any irrational

231.
Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerationsin CorrectingCognitive Biases, 71 S. ECON.
J. 12, 15-19 (2004).
232.
BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 29 (1981).
233.
For a review of the literature on risk perceptions and smoking, see Lucas, supra note 36, at
712-13.
234.
VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 25, at 99-100 (concluding that the smoking rate
would be significantly higher if people did not overestimate the risk of lung cancer).
235.
Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem,supra note 58, at 953. Cf W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKEFILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 61 (2002) (noting that, if smokers
overestimate smoking's risks, that would offset any excessive smoking resulting from ignoring future
health costs).
236.
For reviews of the literature on hedonic adaptation, see George Loewenstein & Peter A.
Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB.
ECON. 1795, 1799-1801 (2008) and Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302, 311-13 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1999).
237.
Loewenstein & Ubel, supranote 236, at 1799; Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 236, at
311-13.
238.
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue & Rabin, Projection Bias, supranote 108, at 1212-14.
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tendency to eat excessively, reducing or perhaps even eliminating the need
for psychic taxes on food.2 39
E. THE EXISTENCE OF HETEROGENEITY

As discussed in Part V, if the goal is to maximize social welfare, then
the government should not necessarily use psychic taxes to minimize
unhealthy consumption. Rather, it should use psychic taxes to achieve the
optimal level of consumption. Given that goal, heterogeneity presents a
significant challenge.
People are heterogeneous in ways that affect whether a psychic tax is
appropriate. For example, some people come closer to the rational actor
ideal than others.2 41 In theory, the government should tailor psychic taxes
to the individual. In other words, the government should use psychic taxes
to avoid harm to those who consume cigarettes and food irrationally, but
should not impose psychic taxes on those who consume rationally. The
problem is that psychic taxes are often a one-size-fits-all solution. For
example, a graphic warning may impose psychic costs on both rational and
irrational consumers.
As a result, heterogeneity forces the government to balance the
benefits to irrational persons against the costs imposed on rational
persons. 24 1 For example, if the government requires graphic warnings on
unhealthy food, the warnings may deter some people from irrational
consumption. However, the warnings may also deter some people from
consumption that would otherwise be rational and utility maximizing. In
economic terms, by deterring rational consumption, the warnings may
reduce consumer surplus, which would constitute a cost of the intervention.
In addition, by provoking unnecessary guilt and anxiety, the warnings will
also impose a cost on rational consumers even if those consumers do not
239. Although the literature on hedonic adaptation suggests that thin people might exaggerate the
negative effects of weight gain on their own happiness, happiness may not be a good measure of overall
well-being. Loewenstein and Ubel argue that happiness "fails to capture a wide range of dimensions of
existence that people deeply and legitimately care about." Loewenstein & Ubel, supra note 236, at
1801. For example, people may care about the range of opportunities available to them. Id. at 1803. If
that is the case, then obesity could reduce well-being, for example, by reducing mobility, even if it does
not significantly affect reported happiness.
240.

See, e.g., Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 173, at 86 ("[A] growing body of

empirical research demonstrat[es] that individuals vary widely, and predictably, in their propensities to
act rationally.").
241.
Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58, at 962 (discussing the problem of
heterogeneity in the context of a sin tax on potato chips); O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 18, at 1835
(discussing the same topic).
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modify their consumption patterns. 242 These costs to rational consumers
could be significant.
Moreover, balancing the benefits to irrational persons against the costs
to rational persons is not an easy task. To determine whether a psychic tax
will produce a net benefit, the government needs to know the percentage of
people who are behaving irrationally and how harmful their irrational
behavior is. The fact that people are heterogeneous makes this information
difficult to acquire.
1. Variables Characterized by Heterogeneity
People are heterogeneous with respect to variables relevant to the
desirability of psychic taxes, including individual preferences; the health
consequences of consuming potentially harmful products; the degree of
irrationality; the capacity for self-regulation; the strength of will power;
and the response to government intervention. This Subsection discusses
each of these variables.
a. Preferences

People are heterogeneous with respect to their preferences. Some
people may be more willing to accept the costs associated with smoking
and unhealthy eating in exchange for the perceived benefits, perhaps
because they enjoy cigarettes or food more than others do. 243 Some people
may also value health less than others, 244 or generally discount the future at
a higher rate. 245 And some people may be less risk-averse than others. For
example, some evidence suggests that smokers are more likely to take risks
than nonsmokers, even when the risks are not directly related to
242.
As noted in Subpart A of this Part, graphic warnings will also make irrational consumers
worse off if the warnings fail to modify behavior. These consumers will experience psychic costs
without any offsetting health benefits.
243.
Smoking for example may deliver a larger benefit to people who are especially stressed,
anxious, or depressed, which could explain why some people smoke and others do not. See Cynthia
Pomerleau, Co-Factorsfor Smoking and Evolutionary Psychobiology, 92 ADDICTION 397, 397-401
(1997).
244.
For a review of evidence that smokers value health less than nonsmokers, see Lucas, supra
note 36, at 703-05.
245.
Researchers have investigated whether smokers have higher discount rates than nonsmokers.
The evidence is mixed. See, e.g., Glenn Harrison, Morten 1. Lau & Elisabet Rustrm, Individual
Discount Rates and Smoking: Evidence from a FieldExperiment in Denmark, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 708,

717 (2010); Robert L. Scharff & W. Kip Viscusi, Heterogeneous Rates of Time Preference and the
Decision to Smoke, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 959, 970-71 (2011); Ahmed Khwaja, Dan Silverman & Frank
Sloan, Time Preference, Time Discounting, and Smoking Decisions, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 927, 927
(2007); Harrell Chesson & W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of Time-Risk Tradeoffs, 13 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 251, 251 (2000).
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smoking. 246 In other words, smokers may have a general propensity for risk
taking not shared by nonsmokers. This preference for risk-taking, not
irrationality, may explain why some people smoke and others do not.
If some people have preferences that cause them to conclude that
smoking and unhealthy eating are worth the risks, then, arguably, the
government should respect those preferences. For those people at least,
psychic taxes would reduce their utility by interfering with their choices.
b. Health Consequences

As discussed in Part IV, paternalists often argue that people
irrationally ignore (either partially or completely) the future health costs of
their behavior. In theory, psychic taxes might correct this problem by
imposing an immediate cost that people cannot disregard. The problem is
that people are heterogeneous with respect to health costs. In fact, some
people may suffer little or no health damage from smoking or overeating,
making psychic taxes completely unnecessary.
With respect to smoking, health damage varies greatly from smoker to
smoker. In fact, a large fraction of smokers quit by their mid-thirties, which
means that they have virtually the same life expectancy as someone who
has never smoked.247 For these people, warnings depicting corpses and

other frightening images serve no purpose other than to provoke
unwarranted anxiety.
People are even more heterogeneous when it comes to the effects of
food on their individual health. Overweight and obesity appear to harm
some population groups more than others.2 48 Similarly, particular foods
may harm certain people but not others. For example, caffeine consumption
may lead to osteoporosis. But the effect appears most pronounced in
women with a certain vitamin D receptor genotype. 249 A second example
relates to energy-dense foods. The energy density of a food reflects its
energy content and is measured by dividing the calories in the food by its
weight.25 ° People tend to consume a constant volume of food regardless of
energy density. 25 1 So energy-dense foods, such as potato chips and

246.

For a review of the literature, see Lucas, supra note 36, at 703-05.

247.

See supra notes 42-43.

248.

Bhattacharya & Sood, supranote 45, at 141-43.

249.

See Strnad, supra note 99, at 1300.

250.

Id. at 1313.

251.

Drewnowski & Specter, supranote 23, at 8.
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doughnuts, may contribute to obesity. 252 Some people may nevertheless
benefit from consuming these foods. In particular, energy-dense foods may
benefit people who need to gain weight because they are recovering from
an eating disorder or elderly people who have digestive problems that make
253
it difficult to consume enough energy.
To illustrate the problems posed by heterogeneity, consider again the
traffic-light color-coding scheme discussed above. Heterogeneity creates
numerous questions. For example, should beverages that contain caffeine
receive a red label even though they likely contribute to osteoporosis for
only a small portion of the population? If energy-dense foods receive a red
label, will individuals who have trouble taking in enough energy drop these
foods from their diets, resulting in malnutrition?
c. Degree of Irrationality, Capacity for Self-Regulation, and
Willpower
254
Irrationality is not evenly distributed among the population.
Consider hyperbolic discounting as an example. Several studies suggest
that hyperbolic discounting is not a universal phenomenon. For example,
Jesfis Fernndez-Villaverde and Arijit Mukherji present evidence that
hyperbolic discounting is much less prevalent than is sometimes
claimed.255 Additionally, in a study of smokers, Michel Grignon concludes
that "there is a considerable amount of individual heterogeneity in the
probability to state present biased time preferences." 256 For those people
who are not hyperbolic discounters, no conflict exists between the discount
factors used by their planning and acting selves. This eliminates a major
rationale for paternalism, including psychic taxes.

People also appear to be heterogeneous with respect to the influence
of food cues and the tendency to engage in mindless eating. In a recent
study of the effects of package size on eating, small one-hundred-calorie
packages substantially reduced consumption among obese people vis-a-vis

252.

Id. at 8-9.

253.

Strnad, supra note 99, at 1316.

254.

For a detailed discussion of individual differences in rational behavior, see generally

Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 173.
255.
Jesdis Fem ndez-Villaverde & Arijit Mukheiji, Can We Really Observe Hyperbolic
Discounting? 14 (Univ. of Pa., NBER & CEPR, Working Paper No. 02-0008, 2006), available at

http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/-jesusfv/hyper2006.pdf.
256.
Michel Grignon, An Empirical Investigation of Heterogeneity in Time Preferences and
Smoking Behaviors, 38 J. SOCtO-ECON. 739, 745 (2009).
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larger packages.25 7 But package size had little effect on consumption
among normal-weight people. 25 8 Another study finds that overweight
people are more likely than normal-weight people to rely on external cues
rather than on internal cues to determine when to stop eating.259
In addition, people differ in their capacity to engage in self-regulation.
For example, compared to overweight people, normal-weight people
experience higher levels of guilt when eating indulgent foods.26 ° Perhaps
this is because normal-weight people are more likely to use guilt to control
their eating. In addition, unlike overweight people, normal-weight people
exhibit behavior likely to reduce mindless eating. In one study, researchers
observed diners eating at a Chinese buffet.26' Compared to obese diners,
normal-weight diners were more likely to browse the entire buffet
(presumably to determine what foods to eat) rather than serving themselves
immediately upon approaching the buffet. 262 Normal-weight diners used
smaller plates, and were more likely to sit facing away from the buffet,
reducing the salience of food.263 These findings are consistent with the
notion that normal-weight people have, consciously or unconsciously,
developed habits that regulate their eating behavior and that obese people
have not.
Similarly, people are heterogeneous with respect to willpower. As
discussed above, willpower is like a muscle: in the short run, it becomes
exhausted with use, but in the long run, people who have frequently
exercised willpower in the past may be more likely to use it successfully in
the future. 2 64 Additionally, some people may be more skilled at using
distraction techniques and other strategies to reduce the cost of exercising
265
willpower.
257.

Brian Wansink, Collin R. Payne & Mitsuru Shimizu, The 100-Calorie Semi-Solution: Sub-

PackagingMost Reduces Intake Among the Heaviest, 19 OBESITY 1098, 1099 (2011).

258.

Id. at 1099.

259.

Brian Wansink, Collin R. Payne & Pierre Chandon, Internal and External Cues of Meal
Cessation: The French ParadoxRedux?, 15 OBESITY 2920, 2921-22 (2007).

260.

Wansink & Chandon, supra note 144, at 607-11.

261.

Brian Wansink & Collin R. Payne, Eating Behavior and Obesity at Chinese Buffets, 16
OBESITY 1957 (2008).

262.
263.

Id. at 1958.
Id.

264.
For reviews of the literature on this point, see Hagger, Wood & Stiff, supra note 228, at
501-18 and Fennell, supranote 167, at 1392-93.
265.
Fennell, supra note 167, at 1393-94. Walter Mischel and his colleagues conducted
experiments in which young children were shown treats such as snacks or toys. Walter Mischel, Yuichi
Shoda & Monica L. Rodriguez, Delay of Gratification in Children, 244 Sct. 933, 934 (1989). The
experimenter then told the children that, to obtain a treat, they would have to wait in a room until the
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In sum, people are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of
underlying irrationality, their capacity to self-regulate, and their ability to
exercise willpower. This significantly weakens the case for psychic taxes.
For example, if normal-weight people are not heavily influenced by food
cues or if they have developed habits that keep their eating in check,
graphic warnings on food may not help them. In fact, graphic warnings
may be harmful. The warnings may discourage normal-weight people from
occasionally indulging in snacks or other enjoyable foods, even though
doing so would not damage their health.
d. Response to Government Intervention

People may also respond to government intervention in different
ways. In particular, government intervention may have little effect upon
those at whom it is targeted. At the same time, it may distort behavior
among rational actors.
In support of this hypothesis, Jason Fletcher and his colleagues find
that younger smokers who have low self-control and high discount rates are
not very responsive to cigarette taxes. 266 Fletcher concludes that "[t]hose
who have the least willpower may need the most help in quitting but are
unresponsive to taxes." 267 If that is correct, then cigarette taxes may simply
burden rational smokers without benefiting smokers who lack self-control.
Similarly, responses to psychic taxes may be heterogeneous. Research
on the use of fear to modify behavior suggests that people respond in
different ways to frightening messages about the risks they face. If people
believe that they can effectively reduce a risk by engaging in the
recommended response-for example, by quitting smoking or dietingthey will do so. 268 But if they believe that they are powerless to do

experimenter returned. The children could ring a bell at any time, and the experimenter would return.

But doing so meant that the child would receive a less appealing treat and forgo a more appealing treat
(for example, one marshmallow instead of two). The experimenter then left the children in the room
with the treat present and exposed. The children who delayed gratification the longest spontaneously
used distraction techniques such as averting their eyes from the treat, singing, or attempting to go to
sleep. Moreover, in a follow-up study conducted ten years later, the children who had successfully
delayed gratification were more likely to be described by their parents as possessing self-control and

able to resist temptation. Id. at 936.
266.
Jason M. Fletcher, Partha Deb & Jody L. Sindelar, Tobacco Use, Taxation and Self-Control
in Adolescence 11-12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15130, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5130.pdf.

267.

Id. at 1.

268.
Kim Witte & Mike Allen, A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective
PublicHealth Campaigns, 27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 591, 594 (2000).
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anything, they may go into denial or otherwise react defensively so as to
reduce their fear. 269 They may deny that the risk applies to them ("I'm not
going to get cancer"), question the motive of the person delivering the
message ("They're just trying to manipulate me"), or just ignore the
message altogether ("This is just too scary to think about").27 ° Others might
even react defiantly to what they perceive as the government dictating their
behavior. In fact, in countries that have adopted graphic warnings on
cigarette packages, many smokers have avoided the warnings by
concealing the packages inside cigarette cases. 271 Because of these
psychological defense mechanisms, graphic warnings and other psychic
taxes might ultimately have little effect upon the very people who need the
most help, that is, those who have the most difficulty abstaining from
cigarettes or maintaining a diet.
2. Is Heterogeneity a Valid Objection to Psychic Taxes?
Jeremy Blumenthal recently criticized the use of heterogeneity as an
objection to paternalism. Blumenthal argues that the objection is overbroad
because it applies to all laws and not just those motivated by
paternalism. 272 To prove his point, he asks whether the government should
eliminate the prohibition on murder, given that most people do not kill.273
Despite Blumenthal's critique, heterogeneity remains a significant
obstacle to welfare-enhancing psychic taxes. Laws prohibiting murder do
not affect individuals who would not commit murder even without the
prohibition (except insofar as the prohibition on murder protects them from
the actions of others). By contrast, a psychic tax on cigarettes or food may
harm rational consumers by, for example, triggering unnecessary guilt.
Even if the government does not care about autonomy per se and aims only
to maximize social welfare, it must take this harm into account. It is
possible that the benefit to irrational consumers will outweigh any harm to
those who are rational. But, as discussed below, the government does not
possess enough information to make that determination. Without this

269.
270.

Id. at 601.
Id. at 594.
See, e.g., HEATHER WARDLE ET AL.,

271.
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH CONSORTIUM,
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF PICTURE HEALTH WARNINGS ON CIGARETTE PACKETS 35-36 (2010).

272.
273.

Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism,supra note 168, at 736-39.
Id. at 737.
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information, psychic taxes are difficult to justify. At the very least, they
274
should be viewed with substantial skepticism.
F.

THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE

Despite efforts at self-regulation, people may still make irrational
choices that reduce their welfare. In that case, a benevolent, omniscient,
and omnipotent social planner could intervene to make them better off. But
real governments are not always benevolent and are never omniscient or
omnipotent. The possibility of government failure poses a major obstacle to
welfare-enhancing paternalism. Three potential sources of government
failure are: (1) imperfect information, (2) unintended consequences, and (3)
flaws in the political process.
1. Imperfect Information
Before intervening paternalistically, a benevolent government should
first determine whether a particular policy will enhance social welfare.
275
Unfortunately, imperfect information makes this task extremely difficult.
Obtaining the necessary information would be challenging even if people
were homogeneous; heterogeneity makes the problem worse. This
Subsection discusses some important variables about which the
government needs information that is difficult to obtain.
a. Extent of IrrationalBehavior
Significant government intrusion in self-regarding decisions, including
the use of psychic taxes, is easier to justify if a large percentage of the
population is smoking or eating irrationally. But whether this is in fact the
case remains a highly controversial question.
A major problem is that the theoretical alternatives to the rational
actor model are often unsupported by compelling evidence. One example is
hyperbolic discounting. As discussed above, some scholars dispute the
274.

Ultimately, Blumenthal's objection seems to rest on the observation that even non-

paternalistic laws intended to correct externalities are plagued by difficulties related to heterogeneity
and imperfect information. See id. at 737-39. But rather than accepting this observation as a reason to
embrace paternalism, an anti-patemalist could subvert Blumenthal's argument by claiming that all
government regulation (including regulation that addresses externalities) is prima facie suspect. Many
laws are overbroad and based on limited information, and they may impose costs that are difficult to

quantify or that are unforeseeable at the time of adoption. Given this, the government should arguably
limit regulation to those instances in which the benefits clearly exceed the known costs. In addition, the
government should take steps to anticipate costs that are not obvious, such as the costs associated with

heterogeneity.
275.
For an in-depth discussion of paternalism and imperfect information, see generally Rizzo &
Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 58.
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claim that hyperbolic discounting is a widespread phenomenon. Another
example is optimism bias. Although paternalists often claim that smokers
are overly optimistic about the risks that they personally face from
smoking, 276 several studies suggest that most smokers either accurately
perceive the risk to themselves or even overestimate that risk.277 In fact, a
recent study testing the optimism bias hypothesis finds that smokers are
"quite accurate on average" at estimating their personal risk.278 The study
concludes that "[t]he lack of association between smoking and optimism in
risk perceptions casts doubt on the idea that continued smoking can be
279
attributed to a rosy view of future risks."
Without persuasive evidence of widespread irrational behavior, the
case for psychic taxes becomes more difficult. If a large percentage of
people smoke or eat rationally, psychic taxes may unnecessarily burden a
substantial number of people while benefiting very few.
At this point, a paternalist might note that new empirical evidence
may someday shed light on the fraction of people who smoke and eat
irrationally. Even if we accept that premise, it suggests that existing
paternalistic proposals are premature and that policymakers should suspend
consideration of them pending further research. After all, paternalistic
policies infringe upon autonomy and generally entail significant hidden
costs, so the burden should fall on paternalists to justify their proposals
with persuasive evidence of irrationality. Moreover, as Gregory Mitchell
argues, empirical evidence is unlikely to ever definitively resolve the
question of how much behavior is irrational.28 ° So paternalists who assume
that a large portion of people act irrationally much of the time are likely
basing this conclusion on their pre-existing values and beliefs about human
28
nature rather than an objective analysis of the facts. '
b. Source ofIrrationality

Effective government intervention requires more than simply labeling
behavior as irrational. The government must also understand the source of

276.

See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 18, at 1186-88.

277.

For a discussion of smoking and optimism bias, see Lucas, supra note 36, at 712-13, 736-

278.

Ahmed Khwaja et al., Are Mature Smokers Misinformed?, 28 J. HEALTH EcON. 385, 396

38.
(2009).
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 173, 135-37.
See id. at 136-37.
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the purported irrationality. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on whether
and why people engage in irrational smoking and eating.
This lack of consensus is problematic because the policy implications
of the theoretical alternatives to the rational actor model often conflict. For
example, if hyperbolic discounting causes smoking and overeating, a
psychic tax on cigarettes and food might be appropriate. The tax would
impose an immediate psychic cost on the acting self, thereby offsetting its
tendency to ignore future costs. But if smoking and overeating result
instead from the presence of random environmental cues, psychic taxes
might have undesirable effects. Assume, for example, that some smokers
are unable to achieve long-term abstinence because they randomly
encounter cues that trigger a virtually irresistible craving to smoke. In that
case, psychic taxes may not prevent them from smoking. Instead, psychic
taxes would only add to the cost of their addiction (over which they
presumably have little or no control). Similarly, if overeating results from
random cues such as large plates or packages, restricting portion size may
be more effective than imposing psychic taxes.
c. Relationship between Food andHealth
Scientific complexity and uncertainty make implementing psychic
taxes on food particularly challenging. For example, consider traffic-light
color-coding. For the government to implement the scheme, it first has to
determine what label (green, yellow, or red) to assign to each food. But
determining whether a food is healthy requires consideration of numerous
variables that may not all point to the same conclusion. And because the
health effects of food are complex, nutrition experts vary widely in their
food rankings.28 2 If nutrition experts cannot agree about which foods are
healthy and which are not, what basis does the government have for
adopting a mandatory labeling scheme?
To illustrate the difficulty of labeling a particular food as healthy or
not, consider Jeff Strnad's discussion of the relationship between vegetable
protein and osteoporosis. 28 3 The incidence of hip fracture, especially
among older women, indicates the rate of osteoporosis in a country.28 4 In
countries with a lower incidence of hip fracture (for example, China),
people consume more vegetable protein relative to animal protein than in

282.
Timothy D. Lytton, Signs of Change or Clash of Symbols? FDA Regulation of Nutrient
ProfileLabeling, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 93, 138-39 (2010).
283.
Strnad, supra note 99, at 1300-09.
284. Id. at 1300.
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countries with a higher incidence of hip fracture (for example, the United
States).28 5 Strnad points out that this evidence suggests that the government
should encourage vegetable protein consumption and discourage animal
protein consumption. 286 One way to encourage vegetable protein
consumption would be to adopt a traffic-light color-coding system and to
assign a green label to soy-based
synthetic meats, which substitute
287
vegetable protein for animal protein.
Nonetheless, some researchers hypothesize that vegetable protein does
not in fact protect against osteoporosis. 28 8 Rather, fruits and vegetables
contain other components that play a protective role.28 9 Synthetic meats
may lack these protective components. 290 In fact, the protein in synthetic
meats might contribute to osteoporosis by causing the body to excrete
calcium. 291 So if the government were to give synthetic meats a green label,
rates of osteoporosis might actually increase.
Similar difficulties would arise if, in an effort to reduce obesity,
traffic-light color-coding focuses on energy density. Some energy-dense
foods, such as nuts and avocados, confer substantial health benefits. 92 This
means that the government must distinguish between healthy energy-dense
foods (which may deserve a green label) and unhealthy energy-dense foods
(which may deserve a red label). As a result, the government will have to
engage in a very difficult line-drawing process. Food manufacturers, for
example, might attempt to avoid the red label on the "junk foods" that they
produce simply by adding vitamins and good fats to those products.29 3
d. AppropriateLevel of Psychic Tax

As discussed above, the government has control over the level of any
psychic tax that it imposes. For example, the psychic costs resulting from
an image of an obese person on a candy bar are likely larger than those
resulting from a red label. And a prominently displayed red label probably
takes a larger psychic toll than simply listing nutritional information on the
back of the candy bar wrapper.
285.
286.

Id. at 1302-04.
Id. at 1307.

287.

Id.

288.

Id. at1304.

289.

Id. at 1304-07.

290.
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Unfortunately, the government lacks sufficient information to
determine the optimal level of any psychic tax. To begin with, the
government must have an accurate understanding of the health
consequences of smoking and obesity. With respect to smoking, the health
consequences are reasonably well established. But the health consequences
of obesity are a different story. Some experts argue that the risks of obesity
have been exaggerated and that the most significant effects are limited to
those who are extremely overweight.2 94
Additionally, even if the government perfectly understood the health
consequences of smoking and obesity, it would still need information about
the level of irrationality. Government intervention is not justified simply
because smoking and obesity are harmful. Intervention is warranted only to
the extent that people irrationally ignore any harmful effects. To illustrate,
assume that hyperbolic discounting causes the acting self to give less
weight than the planning self to the future health consequences of smoking
and eating unhealthy food. Assume also that the government adopts a
psychic tax to address this problem. In theory, the optimal psychic tax is
the one that causes the acting self to give the same weight as the planning
self to the health consequences of smoking and eating. In that case, the
psychic tax would produce exactly the right amount of smoking and
eating-not too much and not too little. Determining the optimal psychic
tax requires knowledge of the health costs that the acting self irrationally
ignores. This in turn depends on the difference between the short-term
discount rate used by the acting self and the long-term discount rate used
by the planning self. If this difference is large, then the acting self is
irrationally ignoring a large amount of health costs, which implies a large
optimal psychic tax.
The problem is that economists have had trouble estimating discount
rates. In a review of the literature, Shane Frederick and his colleagues find
"tremendous variability in the estimates" from one study to the next. 295 The
estimated annual discount rates "range from -6 percent to infinity. 2 96
Additionally, "there is no evidence of methodological progress; the range
of estimates is not shrinking over time." 297 This means that the optimal
psychic tax could range from very small to very large. And if the
government imposes a psychic tax that substantially exceeds the optimal
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level, it may deter a large amount of rational consumption. In other words,
it may frighten people too much.
Moreover, even if the government knew the relevant discount rates, it
would still need information about the effectiveness of self-regulation and
the way in which various failures of rationality interact. As discussed
above, commitment devices and similar strategies reduce the effects of
hyperbolic discounting and other forms of irrationality. And multiple
failures of rationality may offset one another by pushing behavior in
different directions. The end result is that the optimal psychic tax may be
significantly smaller than it would appear absent these mitigating factors.
Additionally, simply knowing the optimal level of the psychic tax is
not sufficient. The government also needs to know the psychic costs
resulting from a given intervention. Retuming again to hyperbolic
discounting, imagine that the acting self irrationally ignores some of the
health costs from eating a candy bar. Specifically, the acting self ignores
health costs amounting to five cents. So consumers will eat the optimal
amount of candy bars if the government increases their price by five cents
or by the psychic cost equivalent of five cents. That begs the question: what
type of intervention will impose five cents worth of psychic costs? Is a red
label sufficient? Or would it be more appropriate to place an image of an
obese person on the front of the package? The answer is unclear because
psychic costs are hard to quantify. The danger is that the government will
impose psychic costs that are too large, which, again, would deter rational
consumption.
2.

Unintended Consequences

Graphic warnings may produce unintended consequences that offset
any health benefits. These unintended consequences could include
counterproductive responses among the target population, such as
unhealthy compensating behavior and substitution of unhealthy tax-exempt
goods. Graphic warnings may also discourage the development of healthier
foods and stigmatize obesity.
a. Unhealthy CompensatingBehavior

Even if psychic taxes effectively reduce consumption of the targeted
goods, people may compensate in ways that undercut any resulting health
benefits. For example, people who quit smoking in response to graphic
warnings may compensate by eating more and gaining weight. Quitting
smoking might increase a person's weight for a number of reasons. For
example, quitting eliminates the metabolism-boosting and appetite-
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suppressing effects of smoking and frees up income to be used for food.2 98
Empirical research on the relationship between quitting smoking and
weight gain has produced mixed results. 299 But a number of recent studies
have concluded that, in addition to reducing smoking, cigarette taxes
increase obesity, perhaps significantly. 30 0 Similarly, graphic warnings that
encourage quitting may also cause obesity. If so, that would mute the
health benefits to the extent of obesity's harmful effects.
Similarly, if psychic taxes on food cause people to substitute food that
the government deems healthy for food that it deems unhealthy, then
people might compensate in ways that substantially reduce any potential
health benefits, such as eating more food or exercising less.30 1 Consistent
with this hypothesis, Brian Wansink and Pierre Chandon found that "lowfat" nutrition labels cause people to eat more, perhaps consuming even
more calories overall than they would if they simply ate regular food.30 2
Why does this happen? Wansink and Chandon provide evidence that
low-fat labels cause people to increase their estimate of the appropriate
portion size and to experience less guilt from consuming food.30 3 This
effect was particularly pronounced among overweight people, who
dramatically increased the number of calories consumed in response to
298- Anindya Sen, Mahdiyeh Entezarkheir & Alan Wilson, Obesity, Smoking, and Cigarette
Taxes: Evidence from the Canadian Community Health Surveys, 97 HEALTH POL'Y 180, 181 (2010);
Charles L. Baum, The Effects of Cigarette Taxes on BMI and Obesity, 18 HEALTH ECON. 3, 4 (2009).
299.
A number of studies find that cigarette taxes contribute to obesity. Baum, supra note 298, at
5; Sen, Entezarkheir & Wilson, supra note 298, at 186; Philip DeCicca, Are Obese Smokers an
Unintended Consequence of Higher Cigarette Taxes? 19 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/ecor/empl/faculty/decicca/working/DeCicca-Obese%20Smokers-2008.pdf,
Shin-Yi Chou, Michael Grossman & Henry Saffer, An Economic Analysis of Adult Obesity: Results
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 23 J. HEALTH EcON. 565, 585 (2004). But
Jonathan Gruber and Michael Frakes find that "there is no evidence for a large weight effect from
smoking cessation." Jonathan Gruber & Michael Frakes, Does Falling Smoking Lead to Rising
Obesity?, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 183, 196 (2006). Similarly, James Nonnemaker and his colleagues find
that cigarette taxes cause only "modest" weight gain among former smokers. James Nonnemaker et al.,
Have Efforts to Reduce Smoking Really Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic?, 47 ECON. INQUIRY 366,
376 (2008).
300.
Baum, supra note 298, at 5 (concluding that cigarette taxes "significantly
increase... obesity and overweight"); Chou, Grossman & Saffer, supra note 299, at 585 (finding that
increases in cigarette taxes have "contributed to the upward trend in obesity"); DeCicca, supra note
299, at 19, 22 (finding that cigarette taxes increase obesity among women and older men); Sen,
Entezarkheir & Wilson, supra note 298, at 186 (using data from Canada and finding "a statistically
significant correlation between higher cigarette taxes and a more obese population").
301.
See Hawley et al., supra note 152, at 5 (noting this possibility).
302.
Wansink & Chandon, supra note 144, at 609-13.
303. Id.at 610.
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low-fat labels. 30 4 These findings suggest that labeling particular foods as
healthy could backfire and lead people to consume more calories than they
otherwise would.
b. Substitution of Unhealthy Tax-Exempt Goods

Traditional sin taxes often shift consumption from taxed goods to taxexempt goods. 3 5 The same phenomenon may occur with respect to psychic
taxes. If graphic warnings appear only on prepackaged food and not food
prepared in restaurants, people may switch to consuming unhealthy food at
restaurants because the psychic cost is lower. The government could avoid
this problem by requiring graphic warnings on restaurant menus. 30 6 But
given the variety of foods sold at restaurants and the myriad ways in which
to place on
those foods are prepared, determining what type of warning
30 7
each menu item presents a serious administrative challenge.
c. Discouragingthe Development of HealthierFood

A potential benefit of graphic warnings on food is that they might
encourage manufacturers to develop healthier foods in an effort to avoid an
unwanted label.30 8 Yet if the government wrongly classifies new products,
a graphic warning system might in fact have the opposite effect. For
example, imagine that a food manufacturer could develop a synthetic meat
that tastes like actual meat but contains less saturated fat.3" 9 If the
manufacturer suspects that, for labeling purposes, the government would
put its new synthetic meat in the same category as nutritionally inferior
meats, then that substantially reduces the manufacturer's incentive to
develop the new product.
d. Stigmatizing Obesity

Obesity stigma is already prevalent in the United States. Studies show
that people generally perceive overweight persons as "lazy, weak-willed,

304.

Id. at 609-10.

305.

See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE 580-82 (2d ed. 2007).

306. The Obama administration's health care legislation contains a provision that requires certain
restaurants to display calorie information on their menus. For a discussion of the menu-labeling
requirement, see generally Michelle 1. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling Law
andLessonsfrom Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901 (2010).
307.
Cf Stmad, supra note 99, at 1294, 1316 (discussing the administrative difficulty of imposing

a sin tax on unhealthy food sold at restaurants).
308.
More research is needed to confirm that graphic warnings in fact have this effect, but the
existing evidence suggests that it is a possibility. See Hawley et al., supranote 152, at 7.
309.
This example is based on an illustration used by Jeff Strnad to show how a sin tax on
unhealthy foods might stifle technical change. See Stmad, supra note 99, at 1297-98.
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unsuccessful, unintelligent, lack[ing] self-discipline, [and] hav[ing] poor
willpower." 310 Increasing obesity stigma might seem like an effective
strategy for motivating people to become or remain thin. But Rebecca Puhl,
whose research focuses on obesity stigma, has concluded that
stigmatization "is not a beneficial public health tool for reducing
obesity. 31 1 Instead, stigmatization can have serious negative repercussions,
including behavior that may lead obese people to gain even more weight.
The negative effects of obesity stigma are numerous. Stigmatization
may increase the risk of depression, low self-esteem, and body
dissatisfaction. 312 It also increases the likelihood of engaging in unhealthy
eating behaviors, such as binge eating and eating as a coping
mechanism. 3 13 Among children, those who are overweight are more likely
to be teased, bullied, and socially isolated. 3 4 And weight-based teasing is
linked to negative attitudes about sports and lower participation in physical
activity. 315 Moreover, obese children who are teased and bullied are
substantially more likely to have suicidal thoughts than their overweight
peers who are not victimized.3 1
Unfortunately, psychic taxes on food might increase obesity stigma
and the adverse consequences associated with it. Consider, for example, the
idea of placing an image on food packages that would indicate the expected
body type of a person who regularly consumes the food in question.
Placing an image of a thin person on healthy foods and an obese person on
junk foods could signal that the government views thin people as more
valuable than obese people.
Moreover, a recent
images of obese people
participants read a news
of the story was neutral;

study suggests that simply viewing unflattering
may increase obesity stigma. 317 Researchers had
story on the prevalence of obesity. 318 The content
it did not portray obesity in a positive or negative

310.
Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, Obesity Stigma: Important Considerationsfor Public
Health, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1019, 1019 (2010).
311.
Id.

312.

Id.at 1023; Rebecca M. Puhl, Weight Stigmatization Toward Youth: A Significant Problem

in Need of Societal Solutions, 7 CHILDHOOD OBESITY 359, 360 (2011).
313. Puhl & Heuer,supra note 310,at 1022.

314.
315.

Puhl, supra note 312, at 359-60.
Id.at360,

316. Id.
317.
See generally Kimberly J.McClure, Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, Obesity in the
News: Do Photographic Images of Obese Persons Influence Anti-Fat Attitudes?, 16 J. HEALTH
COMMC'N 359 (2011).

318.

Id. at362.
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light. The story also contained one of four photographs of an obese person.
Some participants viewed a photograph that portrayed the obese person in a
stereotypical, unflattering way (eating junk food or photographed from
behind).319 Others viewed a photograph that portrayed the obese person in a
non-stereotypical, flattering way (exercising or nicely dressed). After
reading the story, participants who had viewed the unflattering photographs
expressed more negative attitudes toward obese people than participants
who viewed the flattering photographs. 320 This finding and others like it
suggest that, in designing psychic taxes on food, the government should
avoid portraying obese people in a negative light.
3. Flaws in the Political Process
Laws are not adopted by a benevolent and perfectly rational social
planner who acts solely in the public interest, free from political
constraints. Instead, laws are the outcome of a complicated political
process that involves numerous participants who may be imperfectly
rational and motivated, at least in part, by self-interest. As a result, flaws in
the political process might transform a seemingly promising proposal into a
harmful policy. Proposals for psychic taxes are not immune to this
problem.
a. Slippery Slope Concerns

Academic paternalists often claim that they do not want to use the
government to force their beliefs and values onto others.32 ' Rather, they
advocate intervention that will increase the welfare of other people, as
judged by the internal standards of those other people. Some of these
academics even acknowledge that paternalism poses a risk for abuse, so
they argue that the government should intervene only to correct
322
irrationality, while minimizing the burden upon rational behavior.
Although this may seem like a reasonable position, it is unlikely that
all or even most patemalists accept it. Many paternalists are likely
motivated by goals other than maximizing social welfare. They may simply
believe that other people would be better off if those people behaved in a
way that the paternalists find appropriate. And some paternalists may
promote a particular agenda to enhance their own professional or personal
reputations.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Id.at 366.
See, e.g., Sunstein& Thaler, supra note 18, at 1162; Camereretal.,supranote 17, at 1218.
See, e.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 18, at 1200-01.
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As a result, paternalistic intervention may create a slippery slope.
Instead of engaging in a cautious paternalism that respects individual
preferences, the government may become heavy-handed and adopt laws
that force people into a lifestyle condoned by influential advocacy groups.
The literature on slippery slopes suggests that the slide down the slope is
more likely to occur when "the absence of a sharp line between different
cases eases the process of moving from one to another." 323 Unfortunately,
no sharp line exists for distinguishing paternalistic proposals that correct
harmful irrationality from proposals that simply transform the values of
powerful paternalists into government policy.
Psychic taxes present a particularly high risk for creating a slippery
slope. Graphic warnings and other psychic taxes involve the use of
sophisticated psychological techniques to persuade people to behave in a
particular manner. Politicians and regulators may abuse these techniques.
To illustrate, consider the relationship between requiring graphic warnings
on cigarette packages and informed-consent abortion laws. At first glance,
these two policies may seem completely unrelated. But proponents of both
policies make similar arguments in support of them. Recall that smokers
often express regret about smoking. Paternalists use this to argue that, when
people take up smoking, they do not fully appreciate the risks, and the
government can correct this problem using graphic warnings that make the
risks of smoking more vivid. Similarly, anti-abortion advocates often
highlight evidence that some women who have abortions subsequently
regret the decision. 324 Anti-abortion advocates claim that women do not
fully appreciate the emotional effects that an abortion will have on them.
As a result, they argue that informed-consent abortion laws might correct
this problem by requiring that physicians provide information to a woman
considering an abortion.3 25 The information that physicians must provide is
323.
Mario Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalismon the
Slippery Slopes, 51 ARiz. L. REV. 685, 691 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Little Brother].
324.
For example, the Silent No More Awareness Campaign is an anti-abortion group that has a
website that posts testimonials of those who purportedly regret an abortion. According to the
Campaign's website, "[s]o far, 2,610 women and 323 men have said they regret their abortion or lost
fatherhood." About Us, SILENT No MORE AWARENESS, http://www.silentnomoreawareness.org/aboutus (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). For a review of the scholarly literature regarding the psychological
effects of abortion, see Blumenthal, Abortion, supra note 20, at 10-11 (2008) (concluding that "despite
clear scientific findings that such negative consequences are not as common as abortion opponents once
claimed, neither is it entirely outside the scientific 'mainstream' to suggest that certain women are more
at risk of such negative abortion sequelae").
325.

James Eng, Texas Begins Enforcing Strict Anti-Abortion Sonogram Law, NBCNEwS.COM

(Feb. 8, 2012), http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/08/l0355099-texas-begins-enforcingstrict-anti-abortion-sonogram-law?lite (quoting Elizabeth Graham, director of Texas Right to Life, as
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often explicit.3 26 In Texas, for example, the woman generally must have a
sonogram and listen to a detailed description of the fetus.3 2 7 Arguably,
those who support this type of law hope that it will impose psychic costs
328
that reduce the number of abortions.
It seems likely that many of the same people who support graphic
warnings on cigarette packages would also object to Texas's informedconsent abortion law. Yet it is very difficult to draw a principled distinction
between the two policies. Both purportedly respond to evidence that people
sometimes regret prior decisions. And both address this supposed problem
using psychic taxes. At this point, proponents of graphic warnings on
cigarettes might argue that the warnings promote public health, whereas
informed-consent abortion laws carry out an ideological agenda. But antiabortion advocates could respond that their goal is to protect the mental and
emotional health of women who may ultimately regret having had an
abortion.
In any event, this example is not intended to demonstrate that it is
impossible to distinguish between graphic warnings on cigarettes and
informed-consent abortion laws. Rather, it illustrates that no bright line
exists between these two policies. And the absence of a bright line may
facilitate the slide down the slippery slope. One way to resist this type of
slippery slope is to follow bright-line rules. 329 In this case, an appropriate
rule might be that government should regulate based only on harm to
others, not on harm to oneself.
A related concern is whether graphic warnings constitute an
illegitimate policy tool because they involve manipulation and perhaps
even deception. Arguably, lawmakers should satisfy a publicity condition,
according to which they will not engage in acts that they cannot defend in
public in front of those who are subject to those acts. 330 This publicity
stating that her group believes that Texas's informed-consent law will reduce abortions by 30 percent).
For a review of informed-consent abortion laws, see Blumenthal, Abortion, supra note 20, at 6-9.
326.

Blumenthal, Abortion, supra note 20, at 6-9.

327.
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2011).
328.
Commenting on Texas's new law, Rochelle Tafolla, a spokesperson for Planned Parenthood
Gulf Coast, stated that women considering abortions "are quite emotionally upset by it." Eng, supra
note 325. Tafolla notes that "[h]aving to hear the position described of fetal development is not
something they are wanting to endure." Id.Jeremy Blumenthal argues convincingly that many
informed-consent abortion laws contain all of the elements of a well-designed attempt to use fear to
dissuade women from having abortions. Blumenthal, Abortion, supra note 20, at 20-22.
329.
Rizzo & Whitman, Little Brother,supranote 323, at 738.
330.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 115 (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 66-71 (1993); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 139, at 231.
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condition might appeal to people who value autonomy independent of other
considerations. After all, the inability to publicly defend a law
demonstrates a lack of respect for citizens' autonomy. 33 1 Further, because
adherence to the publicity condition may have desirable effects, the
principle might also appeal to consequentialists, who do not care about
autonomy per se, but who do care about the consequences of lawmakers'
actions. 33 2 By encouraging transparency in government, the publicity
condition may facilitate deliberation and the collection of input from all
interested parties, both of which could result in better laws.
Assuming that the publicity condition is a principle worth upholding,
graphic warnings may be problematic. As discussed in Part V, graphic
warnings take advantage of classical conditioning. Like dogs salivating to
the sound of a ringing bell, repeated exposure to a product that contains an
aversive image might condition us to automatically experience negative
emotions when presented with that product. And our negative reaction to
the product may bear little or no relationship to whether consuming it will
actually damage our health. Instead, the reaction may simply be a
conditioned response. For this reason, some might view the government's
333
use of classical conditioning as manipulative.
Similarly, some graphic warnings may be misleading.3 34 Take for
example the FDA's cigarette warning that depicts a corpse with staples in
its chest. Although smoking can lead to lung cancer, not everyone who
smokes contracts the disease. In fact, Kip Viscusi, who has written
extensively about the risks of smoking, finds that the risk of lung cancer is
between 6 and 13 percent.3 35 Moreover, as discussed in Part III, many
smokers quit early enough in life to avoid premature death. The FDA's
graphic warnings do not communicate these nuances. 336 Why not simply

331.
Jolls & Sunstein, supranote 139, at 231.
332. See id.
333.
In response to this argument, proponents of graphic warnings might point out that private
firms often exploit classical conditioning in advertisements. If society generally views this technique as
acceptable when used by private firms, then why should it be off limits to the government? One reason
is that people are free to ignore advertisements that they find offensive, but if the government requires
graphic warnings, consumers cannot easily avoid them.
334. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA (R.J.Reynolds I), 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir.
2012) ("[M]any of the images chosen by FDA could be misinterpreted by consumers.").
335.
Viscusi & Hakes, supranote 22, at 47-48.
336.
In discussing the constitutionality of the FDA's graphic images, Judge Leon of the D.C.
District Court makes a similar point. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA (R.J Reynolds 1), 845 F. Supp.
2d 266, 273 (D.D.C. 2012). He states that "the graphic images are neither factual nor accurate." Id.
Specifically, "the image of the body on an autopsy table suggests that smoking leads to autopsies; but
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print the percentage of smokers who contract lung cancer on the cigarette
package? Arguably, the answer is that graphic warnings are not designed to
encourage informed deliberation about the risks of smoking. Instead, they
are designed to use fear to persuade people to337quit smoking, even if the
images used to achieve this goal are misleading.
Ultimately, if graphic warnings constitute a form of manipulation or
deception, encouraging their use may lead us down a slippery slope.
Policymakers may become comfortable adopting policies that gradually
erode autonomy. Once precedents become firmly established, acts of
manipulation and deception may become easier to justify as long as, in the
judgment of policymakers, the ends justify the means.
b. Imperfectly RationalPolicymakers andExperts

Policymakers and the experts upon whom they rely for advice are not
immune to failures of rationality. At least four distinct failures of
rationality may cause policymakers and experts to be biased in favor of
paternalistic intervention. In other words, failures of rationality may lead
policymakers and experts to conclude that paternalistic intervention,
including psychic taxes, will produce benefits that in reality may never
materialize.
i. ProjectionBias

As discussed in Part IV, projection bias causes people to project their
current preferences into the future. Projection bias can also occur
interpersonally, causing people to project their own preferences onto
others. 338 For example, in judging the popularity of coffee relative to tea,

the Government provides no support to show that autopsies are a common consequence of smoking."
Id.
R.J. Reynolds II, 2012 696 F.3d at 1216-17 (stating that the graphic cigarette warnings
337.
chosen by the FDA "cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers,"
but instead "are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat
consumers into quitting"); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 528 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting in part) ("It appears, from the government's own evidence, that the color
graphic warning labels are intended to create a visceral reaction in the consumer, in order to make a
consumer less emotionally likely to use or purchase a tobacco product."); R. Reynolds 1, 845 F. Supp.
2d at 272 (noting that "the graphic images [chosen by the FDA for use on cigarette packages] were
neither designed to protect the consumer from confusion or deception, nor to increase consumer
awareness of smoking risks; rather, they were crafted to evoke a strong emotional response calculated
to provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking").
338.
Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making I, supra note 110, at 98.
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coffee drinkers believe that coffee is more popular than do tea drinkers. 339
Similarly, policymakers and experts may project their preferences onto
others. Policymakers and experts who eat a healthy diet and do not smoke
may assume that others value health as much as they do. They may find it
difficult to comprehend how anyone could rationally determine that the
benefits of smoking or eating unhealthy food outweigh the health costs. As
a result, policymakers and experts might conclude that anyone who smokes
or who is overweight must be acting irrationally and that these irrational
people would be better off if the government coerced them into healthier
behavior using psychic taxes and similar policies. 340 But ultimately, this
judgment may not reflect an accurate perception of others' true preferences.
Rather, it may result from policymakers' and experts' projection of their
own preferences onto everyone else.
Projection bias will be particularly problematic if the preferences of
policymakers and experts differ systematically from the preferences of
those affected by paternalistic policies, as is likely the case. Smoking and
poor diet are much more prevalent among the poor and uneducated.34 1
Since academics, politicians, and regulators are generally neither poor nor
uneducated, they are much less likely to consume the cigarettes and
unhealthy foods that would be subject to psychic taxes and other forms of
regulation.
Moreover, policymakers may be biased in favor of imposing austere
lifestyles upon others. Joris Lammers and his colleagues argue that power
increases hypocrisy. 342 Hypocrites "are people who publicly uphold strict
moral norms, expecting and demanding others to follow them, but who
privately violate these espoused standards in their own behavior." 343 For
example, a politician might speak publicly about the erosion of family
values while privately having an extramarital affair. 344 In his experiments,
Lammers finds evidence that those in positions of power are more
339.
Lyle Brenner & Baler Bilgin, Preference,Projection, and Packing: Support Theory Models
of Judgments and Others' Preferences, 115 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 121, 122

(2011).
340.
Cf Loewenstein, Medical Decision Making I, supra note 110, at 98 ("[1]f you are not
currently craving a drug, the reckless immoral behavior of someone who is craving a drug is likely to
appear incomprehensible, and one would be likely to judge that individual more harshly than might be

deserved.").
341.
See infra Part VI.G.
342.
Joris Lammers, Diederik A. Stapel & Adam D. Galinsky, Power Increases Hypocrisy:
Moralizing in Reasoning,Immorality in Behavior,21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737, 742 (2010).
343.
Id. at 737.
344.
Id.
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hypocritical. Specifically, the powerful are more likely to cheat while at the
same time condemning cheating by others. 345 In addition, with respect to
moral transgressions such as underreporting income on a tax return, the
346
powerful hold others to a higher standard than they hold themselves.
347
Lammers finds that those who are not powerful do not exhibit hypocrisy.
He speculates that hypocrisy among the powerful stems from a sense of
entitlement. 348 Those in power believe that they have the right to judge
others because the powerful are responsible for maintaining moral
norms. 34 9 Yet the powerful also feel entitled to deviate from the moral rules
350
they expect others to follow.
Hypocrisy among the powerful has significant implications for
psychic taxes. By definition, policymakers are in positions of power. As a
result, they may support policies that compel others to behave in a way that
they themselves do not. For example, policymakers may support graphic
warnings on cigarettes and unhealthy food because they believe others
should not smoke and should adhere to a strict diet. But in private, these
same policymakers may feel free to smoke or to eat without restraint.
ii. Motivated Reasoning

Motivated reasoning describes our tendency to rationalize conclusions
that we in fact reached for other reasons. 35 1 This tendency is constrained by
our ability to construct apparently reasonable justifications for our
conclusions. 352 Nonetheless, reasoning is not independent of goals and
motivation. For example, one study divided participants into those who
favored capital punishment and those who did not.35 3 The researchers then
described to the participants two studies that used different methodologies
and reached opposite conclusions as to whether capital punishment deters
crime.35 4 Participants were more critical of the study that disconfirmed

345.

Id. at 738-39.

346.

Id. at 739-41.

347.

Id. at 742.

348.

Id. at 738.

349.
350.

Id.
Id.

351.

See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480

(1990) (providing a detailed discussion of motivated reasoning).
352.
Id. at 480.
353.
Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization:The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100 (1979).

354.

Id.

Paternalismand Psychic Taxes

20131

their prior beliefs than of the study that confirmed their prior beliefs. 355
Interestingly, after exposure to these two conflicting studies, participants'
356
views of capital punishment actually became more polarized.
Similarly, many policyrnakers and experts have strong motivation to
conclude that paternalistic intervention will be beneficial. For the
academics who identify and study biases and other failures of rationality,
their work becomes more important if it serves as the basis for government
action. 357 For politicians, adopting paternalistic laws allows them to take
credit for addressing perceived societal problems such as smoking and
obesity. For regulators, paternalistic intervention allows them to increase
their agency's power and to exert more control over market exchanges. In
the end, all of these people may be able to enhance their own self-esteem
and reputations by advocating policies that will ostensibly save people
from their own "bad" choices.
Having a powerful motive to support paternalistic intervention may
cause policymakers and experts to wrongly conclude that such intervention
is desirable. 358 Policymakers and experts may focus on the potential
benefits of intervention while ignoring the potential costs, particularly costs
that are not obvious. 359 For example, those who favor placing images of
obese people on food might discount the psychic costs that these labels
impose by stigmatizing obesity.
Policymakers and experts do not have to be corrupt to fall victim to
motivated reasoning. Imagine for example that academics in a particular
field strongly support paternalistic intervention to improve health. Under
these circumstances, academics in that field might be more likely to
enhance their reputations if they publish articles that present paternalism in
a favorable light. In that case, motivated reasoning may bias their views in

355.

Id. at 2101-03.

356.

Id. at 2102-04.

357.

Cf Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 173, at 72 ("Behavioral law and economics

scholars simplify and overgeneralize findings on human cognition and rationality to make these
findings seem simultaneously important and simple enough to be incorporated into legal policy.").
358.
See generally Slavisa Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, 17 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES
ETUDES HUMAINES, art. 3 (2011).

359.
Cf Klick & Mitchell, supra note 165, at 1639 ("If the paternalist invests significant political
capital to advance paternalistic policies, the pressure to find evidence confirming the need for
paternalism is likely to be significant as well, making the likelihood of a self-fulfilling prophecy quite
high."); Pratt, supra note 45, at 129 (noting that public health advocates ignore the potential loss of
consumer surplus resulting from a soda tax and these advocates simply assume that people would be
better off if they respond to a soda tax by drinking less soda and more water).
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favor of paternalism. This could be the case even if they truly believe that
they reached their opinions through objective reasoning.
Another example of the potential power of motivated reasoning stems
from the ongoing debate over the consequences of obesity. Skeptics of the
notion that obesity is an "epidemic" argue that some researchers exaggerate
obesity's health effects to secure funding for their research and to promote
their own political agenda. 360 If obesity researchers do in fact have a

financial or political stake in the outcome of their research, their
conclusions may be biased. This could be the case even if the researchers
are not consciously corrupt and earnestly attempt to remain objective.
iii. FocusingIllusion
As discussed in Subpart A of this Part, focusing illusion describes our

tendency to overestimate the importance of whatever our attention is
directed toward and to underestimate the importance of those aspects of a
situation on which we are not focused. Focusing illusion could bias the
opinions of policymakers and experts. 361 For example, public health

advocates devote much of their time to health issues, so when they evaluate
paternalistic interventions, focusing illusion could cause them to give
disproportionate weight to health concerns. Public health advocates may

minimize the importance of competing factors, such as individual
autonomy. They may also ignore the possibility that some people might
362
rationally sacrifice good health to pursue other goals.

360.
See Hector, supra note 45, at 109-10 (discussing the controversy surrounding researchers'
view of obesity as an "epidemic").
361.
Cf Tasic, supra note 358, at 6 (arguing that focusing illusion may cause regulators to "be
deluded that they are doing the right thing because they are unable to see the wider context").
362.
In his defense of expert paternalism, Jeremy Blumenthal argues that, within their particular
domains, experts often make better decisions than lay persons in part because experts have techniques
for avoiding the effects of cognitive limitations and biases. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism,supra note
168, at 749-55. He notes that this is true for various kinds of experts, including physicists, chess
masters, and weather forecasters. Id. at 751-52. Certainly, experts in a technical field often have a
substantial advantage over lay persons with respect to issues related to that field. But even in technical
fields, a particular expert's opinion might be biased. For example, if a nutrition expert has publicly
promoted a particular diet, motivated reasoning may bias her interpretation of evidence related to the
effectiveness of that diet. In some instances, this problem might be overcome by relying on a group of
experts instead of a single expert. But that approach assumes that all members of the group will not be
biased-an assumption that may not always be valid. If many of the experts in a field are motivated to
reach a particular conclusion or if many of them suffer from focusing illusion, then all or most of the
experts within the field may suffer from similar biases. In fact, many paternalists are heavily invested in
the notion that paternalism will improve people's lives, so it would not be surprising if they tend to
interpret evidence in a way that confirms this conclusion.
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iv. The Intentions Heuristic

The intentions heuristic is the tendency to judge a policy based on the
intentions of its advocates rather than on the policy's actual
consequences.363 The idea is that good results flow from good intentions
and bad results flow from bad intentions. 364 Given that paternalists
generally advocate well-meaning policies, the intentions heuristic may
cause policymakers and voters to pay little attention to the trade-offs
365
involved with paternalistic policies or to unintended consequences.
When combined with projection bias, motivated reasoning, and focusing
illusion, the intentions heuristic may bias policymakers in favor of
paternalism, and this bias might facilitate the slide down the slippery slope
toward increasingly intrusive government regulation.
c. Rent Seeking

Rent seeking describes "behavior in institutional settings where
individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than
social surplus." 366 Consider, for example, an airline's effort to persuade the
government to grant it a monopoly over certain routes. 367 If successful, the
stakeholders in the airline will benefit, but only at the expense of
consumers who will pay higher fares. When fares increase, consumers will
fly less frequently, reducing consumer surplus. 368 Furthermore, to obtain
and protect the monopoly, the airline will redirect spending toward
lobbying efforts that do not create anything of social value. Government
officials will then divert their attention to airline lobbyists and away from
more productive matters.
As with monopolies, psychic taxes, particularly those imposed on
food, may also encourage rent seeking. The food industry is no stranger to
the rent-seeking process. Jeff Strnad explains that the industry has used its
363.
Jeffrey Friedman, Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of Ignorance,
17 CRITICAL REV. i, xix-xxi (2005). See also Tasic, supra note 358, at 6.

364.
365.

Friedman, supra note 363, at xx.
Both Jeffrey Friedman and Slavisa Tasic argue that the intentions heuristic can cause people

to ignore the unintended consequences of and the trade-offs required by particular policies. Tasic, supra

note 358, at 6; Friedman, supra note 363, at xx.
366.

James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-

SEEKING SOCIETY 3,4 (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980).
367. This illustration is based on an example found in DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III
334-35 (2003).

368.
As noted above, consumer surplus is "the amount a buyer is willing to pay for a good minus
the amount the buyer actually pays for it." MANKIw, supra note 17, at 139. As monopoly increases the
price of flying, consumers will buy fewer plane tickets. This eliminates the surplus that consumers
would have otherwise enjoyed from those tickets.
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political influence to obtain agricultural subsidies that arguably have little
economic justification. 69 Additionally, the industry has had substantial
some argue have
input into the FDA's nutritional guidelines, which
370
nutrition.
about
confusion
contributed to the public's
To illustrate how rent seeking might work in the context of psychic
taxes on food, consider again traffic-light color-coding. 371 As already
discussed, even unbiased experts might find it difficult to determine which
foods should contain a green label and which should contain a yellow or
red label. Food manufacturers would likely seize upon this ambiguity. They
may persuade lawmakers to give certain foods a green or yellow label even
though at least some experts believe that those foods deserve a red label. In
that case, consumers may be misled in a way that harms public health.
As alluded to above, one particular problem that could arise is food
manufacturers attempting to persuade the government that simply adding
certain nutrients to food is sufficient to avoid a red label.372 This policy
would likely cause the food supply to become saturated with nutrients such
as calcium and vitamin A. This could be problematic because some
373
nutrients have negative side effects when consumed in large quantities.
374
Rent seeking could also hinder the development of healthier foods.
Recall the example of a manufacturer that develops a low-fat, synthetic
meat. Although the new meat might be healthier than existing meats, the
manufacturers of existing meats, not wanting the public to know this, might
lobby the government to put the new meat in the same category as existing
meats for labeling purposes. Anticipating this type of opposition, many
manufacturers may reduce their investment in developing healthier foods.
After all, why would a manufacturer develop a health food if it could not
market the food as such due to pathologies in the political process?

A related issue involves the difficulty of changing the law in response
to changes in food science. Because of ongoing research, scientific opinion
about whether a particular food is healthy may change over time. As a
result, experts may conclude that a food that the government initially

369.
Stmad, supra note 99, at 1295-96.
370.
Id. at 1296.
371.
Many food manufacturers would oppose this scheme, but for argument's sake, I will assume
that the government adopts it anyway.
372.
See Strnad, supra note 99, at 1315-16 (discussing this problem in the context of a sin tax on
food).
373.
For example, consuming too much calcium and vitamin A may be dangerous. Id. at 1315.
374.
See id. at 1297-98 (discussing this problem in the context of a sin tax on food).
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labeled as green should now receive a yellow or red label. Yet
manufacturers harmed by that change would likely expend significant
resources in opposition to it, and the government might ultimately leave the
label unchanged, thereby misleading consumers.
G.

UNWANTED DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS

Like traditional sin taxes, psychic taxes on cigarettes and food may be
regressive in the sense that the psychic costs they impose would fall
disproportionately on the poor. The reason psychic taxes may be regressive
is that the poor are more likely to smoke and to be obese. In 2010, the
smoking rate for adults living below the federal poverty level was
28.4 percent, while it was only 9.1 percent for adults with a family income
of $100,000 or more. 375 Similarly, obesity and poor dietary quality are
376
more common among people with low incomes and education levels.
This may be because energy-dense foods, especially those with added
sugars and fats, are generally less expensive per calorie. 377 Because of this,
poor people may consume energy-dense foods to stretch their food
378
budgets.
An important caveat to the conclusion that psychic taxes will be
regressive relates to the possibility that psychic taxes may have their
desired effect. In other words, the poor may respond to psychic taxes by
smoking less and eating healthier. If that happens, then the effect on utility
is ambiguous. If low-income consumers were acting rationally prior to the
adoption of psychic taxes, any change in behavior will decrease their
utility: consumers will no longer purchase goods for which the benefits
outweigh the pre-psychic tax costs based on the consumers' own rational
calculations. This reduction in utility would make psychic taxes even more
regressive than they would be if the government's efforts did not affect
behavior. But if failures of rationality cause low-income consumers to
smoke and to eat excessively, those who respond to a psychic tax by
smoking and eating less will increase their utility. The psychic tax would
simply encourage these people to do something they should have done

375.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 21, at 88. Those who have a college
degree are also significantly less likely to smoke than those who do not. Id.
376.
Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 23, at 6-14.
377.
Id. at 9.
378.
Id. at 11-14.
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already. 379 This welfare gain might partially, fully, or more than fully offset
380
any corresponding psychic cost, making the psychic tax less regressive.
Unfortunately, determining whether a particular psychic tax is
regressive may be infeasible because it requires a comparison of the
resulting welfare gains to any psychic costs. That, in turn, would require
measuring the psychic costs, predicting how consumers will respond to the
psychic tax, and determining the extent to which smoking and eating are
irrational. Obtaining this information is difficult at best and probably
impossible.
Nonetheless, it is still useful to recognize that psychic taxes may
burden the poor disproportionately. If we expect a particular psychic tax to
impose large psychic costs on the poor, then before recommending its
adoption, we should be at least reasonably certain that those costs will be
less than any expected welfare gains. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V,
we do not currently have persuasive evidence that graphic warnings on
cigarette and food packages will reduce smoking and obesity. Given that
these warnings may impose substantial psychic costs, we should exercise
caution in recommending that the government require them.
H. THE EXISTENCE OF MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS
In some cases, market-based solutions may reduce or eliminate the
rationale for psychic taxes. And when available, market-based solutions are
often preferable to psychic taxes. Unlike psychic taxes, market-based
solutions do not burden autonomy and can better accommodate
heterogeneity. Market-based solutions also avoid unwanted distributive
effects and the costs associated with government failure.
Some private products are designed specifically to address failures of
rationality. An example is the website StickK.com, which assists those who
have self-control problems. The website allows you to enter into a

379.
Cf Jonathan Gruber & Botond Kszegi, Tax Incidence When Individuals Are TimeInconsistent: The Case of CigaretteExcise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1980 (2004) (noting that "a

price-induced decrease in consumption [of cigarettes] may be good for the agent, because it softens the
overconsumption due to the desire for immediate gratification [that results from hyperbolic
discounting]").
380.
A sin tax on cigarettes might also reduce irrational smoking, which could produce welfare
gains that would make the tax less regressive than it would otherwise appear. Whether these welfare
gains actually occur and whether they do, in fact, make cigarette taxes substantially less regressive is a
controversial question. See Lucas, supra note 36, at 738-42 (reviewing the relevant literature).
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commitment contract. 38" First, you establish a goal, such as quitting
smoking or losing weight, and commit to the goal by putting money at
stake. Then you select a referee (for example, a family member) to verify
whether you achieved the goal. If you fail, you forfeit the money. You can
even designate an anti-charity, which is an organization that promotes
values with which you disagree, as the recipient of any forfeited money. By
imposing immediate costs on those who fail to achieve their long-term
goals, commitment contracts can counteract any tendency to irrationally
ignore the future consequences of behavior.
Other products attempt to curtail mindless eating. For example, some
companies sell snacks in small, portion-size packages.3 82 As discussed in
Part IV, small packages help people eat less. Additionally, some
restaurateurs have modified their restaurants in response to mindless-eating
research.38 3 For example, some restaurants have replaced short, wide
drinking glasses with taller, thinner ones, while others have switched to
smaller plates. 384 These simple adjustments reduce the number of calories
that patrons consume while also reducing the restaurants' costs.
People who engage in irrational behavior may also be helped by
certain products, even if those products are not designed specifically to
address irrationality. For example, nicotine replacement therapy makes it
easier to quit smoking, whether or not the decision to start smoking was
rational.3 85
In addition, some supermarkets voluntarily post nutritional
information on store shelves. This information can help all consumers,
whether rational or not. Although the research is in its early stages, existing
evidence suggests that shelf labeling may encourage healthier purchasing
decisions. 386 Moreover, a voluntary labeling program has several
advantages over a government-mandated labeling scheme. First, if labeling
381.
See About StickK.com, STICKK.COM, http://www.stickk.com/about.php (last visited Jan. 25,
2013) (providing a description of the StickK.com business model, including a description of the
commitment contract that users enter into).
382.
Wansink, Payne & Shimizu, supra note 257, at 1098.
383.
Wansink, Just & Payne, Healthy Heuristics, supranote 79, at 244-45.
384. Id.
385.
For example, the estimated abstinence rate six months after quitting is between 25.4 and
33.2 percent for varenicline users (depending on dosage) and between 19 and 26.1 percent for nicotine
gum users (depending on duration of use). This compares to a 13.8 percent abstinence rate for those
receiving placebo treatment. Abstinence rates are even higher for certain combination therapies such as
nicotine gum and the nicotine patch. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH BENEFITS
OF SMOKING CESSATION (1990).
386.
See Hawley et al., supra note 152, at 6-7.
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is voluntary, consumers who object to the labels are free to shop at a store
that does not use them. Second, voluntary labeling promotes competition
with respect to developing criteria for determining the healthfulness of
food, which is important because nutrition experts do not always agree on
which foods are healthy. Voluntary labeling also encourages competition to
develop the most effective labels for communicating nutritional
387
information to consumers.
The primary concern with voluntary shelf labeling is that, in the
absence of government regulation, consumers might not find the labels
credible because of suspicion about food industry influence. One way to
address this problem would be for a panel of independent experts to
develop the labeling criteria. In fact, such a labeling scheme already exists.
The NuVal Nutritional Scoring System is based on an algorithm
"developed by a multidisciplinary group of nutrition and public health
scientists independent of food industry interests." 388 A food's NuVal score
ranges from one to one hundred, with a higher score indicating a healthier
food.389 Participating supermarkets display NuVal scores on their store
shelves. 39' Even critics of voluntary labeling schemes have acknowledged
39 1
the scientific integrity of the NuVal ratings.
Moreover, critics of voluntary labeling should not assume that the
government would adopt labels without substantial input from the food
industry. As discussed in Subpart F of this Part, the food industry may in
fact exert excessive influence over any government-mandated labeling
scheme. A major advantage of private labeling systems such as NuVal is
that they are not subject to the potentially corruptive influences of the
political process. Also, the supermarkets that use private labeling systems
have an incentive to maintain the integrity of those systems to keep
392
consumers from taking their business elsewhere.
Despite the availability of market-based solutions, paternalists often
argue that government intervention is still necessary. 393 They point out that

387.
Lytton, supra note 282, at 135-36.
388.
David L. Katz et a]., Performance Characteristics of NuVal and the Overall Nutritional
Quality Index (ONQ1), 91 AM. J.CLINICAL NUTRITION 1102S, 1102S (2010). For a list of the scientists

involved in developing the algorithm used by NuVal, see id. at 1103S.
389.

Id.at 1108S.

390.

For further information about NuVal, including a list of participating supermarkets, see

Where to find NuVal, NUVAL.COM, http://www.nuval.com/location (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
391.
Lytton, supra note 282, at 135-36.

392.

Id.

393.

E.g., Gruber & K6szegi, Is Addiction "Rational",supra note 18, at 1286.
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market-based solutions are sometimes subject to unraveling by other
private transactions. 39 4 For example, people who enter into a commitment
contract with StickK.com could subsequently persuade their referees to
verify that they had achieved their goals even though they had not. This
might be embarrassing, but it would allow them to get their money back.
On the other hand, psychic taxes and other forms of government
intervention may not be as easy to circumvent. Additionally, unlike marketbased solutions, government policies, including psychic taxes, are not
voluntary. This means that government policies are more likely to benefit
people who are not sophisticated enough to realize that their behavior is
irrational.
While these criticisms are worth noting, it is also important to
recognize the benefits of market-based solutions. Market-based solutions
avoid many of the problems associated with government intervention.
Moreover, the fact that some people might be naive about their irrationality
does not necessarily provide a strong rationale for heavy-handed
intervention. After all, paternalists generally cannot be certain that a
particular individual is behaving irrationally if that individual herself
claims otherwise. So in many cases, the best approach to dealing with
naivety may be to educate people about the possibility that they are
irrational and about how they can avoid the deleterious effects of
irrationality.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In theory, psychic taxes, including graphic warnings, might produce
significant benefits. If failures of rationality cause people to make
suboptimal choices, the government could use psychic taxes to improve
people's lives. Unfortunately, real-world governments are not perfect, so
the implementation of psychic taxes presents a number of potentially
serious challenges. Due to imperfect information, heterogeneity, and the
possibility of unintended consequences, it is difficult to predict whether
psychic taxes will in fact prove beneficial. Moreover, in some cases,
graphic warnings and other psychic taxes may be deceptive. Additionally,
acceptance of psychic taxes as a legitimate policy tool may lead us down a
slippery slope toward policies that are harmful and even abusive. Finally,
since the government is likely to target goods that are consumed
disproportionately by the poor, psychic taxes may be regressive.

394.

E.g., id. See also Fennell, supra note 167, at 1417.
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Because of these concerns, this Article expresses skepticism about the
use of psychic taxes. Self-regulation and market-based solutions will often
eliminate the effects of irrationality, making psychic taxes unnecessary.
Even when that is not the case, psychic taxes create the potential for
considerable costs, many of which are difficult to identify in advance or to
quantify. So the government should not employ psychic taxes without
compelling evidence that the benefits will be substantial.39 5 In particular,
the lack of strong empirical support for graphic warnings on cigarettes and
food suggests that these warnings are not worthwhile.

395.
Cf Klick & Mitchell, supranote 165, at 1661 ("Given the restrictions on liberty associated
with paternalism and the attendant cognitive and moral hazards identified here, we believe that the
paternalist should bear the burden of demonstrating that the benefits of a paternalistic intervention will
likely outweigh the costs.")

